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MILITARY AFFAIRS

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CONTENTS	PAGE
Naval Training and Related Activities (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, various dates)	1
Submarine Crew Training Methods, by N. Yermolayev	
Competition Between Ships, by A. Zlydnev	
On the Escort Ship 'Sil'nyy', by V. Yelovskiy	
Aviation Crew Training, by A. Biryukov	
Pipe-Laying Battalion, by A. Zlydnev	
Shipboard Maintenance Officer Training, by B. Kalistratov	
On a Minesweeper, by A. Glagolev	
On the 'Minsk', by G. Savichev	
Submarine Officer Training, by D. Chumak	
Escort Ship 'Razitel'nyy', by V. Balashov	
Guard Service: Importance Stressed (A. Khorev, V. Filatov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 Sep 79)	33
Criticism: Report and Action Discrepancies (I. Vashkevich; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 Sep 79)	37
Shortcomings: Motor Vehicle Maintenance (I. Yaunzem; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Sep 79)	40
Command Training: Need for Initiative Discussed (A. Shcherbakov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 Sep 79)	41
Combat Traditions: Importance Stressed (Ye. Stroganov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 Sep 79)	45
Armed Forces: Social Role Discussed (K. Vorob'yev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 Sep 79)	48

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
General Gorchakov's Advice to Junior Officers (P. Gorchakov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Sep 79)	54
Publications: Errors in Air Defense Journal Criticized (A. Sherstyuk; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 Sep 79)	57

NAVAL TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Submarine Crew Training Methods

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank N. Yermolayev: "Interest in Drills"]

[Text] While still a young commander of the missile department on a submarine, I often had the occasion to encounter what at first glance was a rather strange phenomenon. The rapid growth in the seamen's practical skills suddenly began to slow down. It would appear that having mastered their functional duties, the missilemen should have worked with even greater enthusiasm but they, on the contrary, behaved passively on drills. And attempts to make the training process more active were not very successful.

At the same time, there were no grounds to reproach the missilemen for indifference toward the subunit's affairs. The department held firmly to its outstanding position, and any good undertaking found a lively response in the entire collective. But as a missileman-specialist, I saw that there was no genuine tension on our drills. It was difficult for the ship's commander to recognize this, but one day I turned to him for advice (at that time, the commander was Captain 1st Rank Yu. Lazarev). He had been the head of a crew for many years, had many long cruises behind him, and enjoyed the authority of a competent methodologist and teacher. Lazarev did not begin to say anything ahead of time, but he came to the department on the very first drill.

"Everything is correct, but uninteresting," the commander recapitulated briefly, taking me aback. "It is worth pondering over this."

What does "interesting" mean? For this is work, not a game. Difficult, complex, requiring the complete straining of attention, will, and physical strength. But nevertheless, on the advice of the commander I began to read military-educational literature and visited drills in other departments and on adjacent ships, which I had never done before. I also became interested in the methodology of drills and in their psychological atmosphere. The view from the side provided much. First of all, I came to the conclusion that preparation for a drill is not simply understanding the order

and extent to which the subordinates should work things out. It was necessary to think out how to make it effective and cognitive to the greatest degree specifically for each of them and how to attract specialists with the training process.

At first, work on preparations for drills increased significantly. But satisfaction with results also grew. The missilemen began to work with increased interest, competing actively with one another. The first suggestions on improving the quality of the drills appeared and the department's rationalizers were disclosed here. The seamen built a trainer which permitted the realistic working out of those actions which formerly were only accomplished provisionally. And really, I myself as department commander felt increased interest in lessons with the personnel.

Unquestionably, in the life of the crew the primary task is the mastery of weapons and equipment and obtaining firm skills in their combat employment. And when the commander of a subunit receives young replacements, he strives to teach his new subordinates as quickly as possible and to train full-fledged replacements for the experienced specialists who have departed. And although this process bears a cyclic nature, much in it is repeated each year but objective requirements of life are such that the general level of the ability, skill, and technical style of the subunit, unit, or ship must be constantly improved despite the renewal of the personnel.

Once, I had the occasion to visit a submarine on which I served several years ago. The equipment had not changed--the same strong hull, the same mechanisms and weapons. But now this ship accomplishes missions about which we didn't even think at one time. I jealously looked attentively at the submarine's present crew. It seems that they are the same seamen and officers, but then, they are able to do more. However, this is not their only merit. All those who served on this ship and on ships of the same type accumulated experience little by little and constantly looked for ways to improve the quality of drills and exercises and this permitted raising the level of the crew's skill. And the trainer which we created and at one time seemed to be a great achievement became a regular device for our successors. They had already thought of how to proceed farther.

Unfortunately, not each forthcoming specialty drill for which an officer prepares is as yet always planned as a new step in the mastery of equipment. But you see, it is the new which is genuinely interesting. And it is not by chance that as soon as they master their functional duties sufficiently well, the seamen begin to lose interest in the drills if they are organized without consideration of their growing skill. A mechanical, monotonous repetition of actions and operations already known alone cannot cause creative activity.

Interest in the drill in each of its participants is a necessary element of training which testifies primarily to the conscientious attitude of the men toward the matter. Yes, firm practical skills are acquired as a result of numerous repeated actions, but in this case their content should constantly

be enriched. Turning to new material mobilizes the intelligence of the serviceman but, at the same time, it also affects his feeling. In principle, gravitation toward the unknown and the striving to move forward are inherent in a person. And this factor should be considered both in combat training and in political-indoctrinational work

For four years the submarine of the Red Banner Northern Fleet on which officer Potapov serves has won first place in the Navy for one of the types of combat training. The secret of this success is primarily in the high state of training and teamwork of the ship's combat crew (KBR). The ship's commander utilizes every opportunity at sea or at the base for drills. As a matter of fact, the same elements of combat exercises in the search for the "enemy," classification of targets, tracking them, and going into the attack are worked out.... But it is hardly possible to find two out of the innumerable set of these drills which repeat one another. The skillful simulation of the tactical background, the full-fledged use of all the situation's possibilities, an individual determination of the nature and extent of the load for each crew member, and well organized competition permit the commander to attain a lively, interested attitude of the submariners toward drill which increases its effectiveness perceptibly. And during the entire four years the crew does not simply confirm its former high results, but it demonstrates the progressive growth of its combat skill as it successfully accomplishes all the more difficult missions.

Now and then, one may hear complaints of lesson leaders that there are no conditions for the interesting conduct of drills. They say that it is necessary to conduct drills on combat equipment, especially during cruises, only in an extremely provisional manner. Trainers, training-drill stations, and various operating diagrams and models also have limited possibilities.... It goes without saying that the more improved the training-material base, the easier it is to organize a full-fledged drill. But nevertheless, its effectiveness depends primarily on the methodological and professional skill of the commander, on his creative aspiration, and on his profound understanding of the goals of the training which is directed toward raising the combat readiness of the ship.

I had the occasion to see dull, unproductive drills in damage control in excellently equipped training-drill stations. Sea water lashed against holes, a flame engulfed a compartment, but nevertheless the conventionality of the drill was felt in all the seamen's actions. They had become accustomed to the station, to its holes and fires in stipulated places and most important, to the monotony of drill with outwardly effective attributes. But at the same time, frankly I often had the occasion to be surprised how, with the most modest material support, officers conducted absorbing drills which were full-blooded in their result. This is how Engineer-Captain 3d Rank V. Spitsyn was able to create a background of real actions under any conditions. He always thought the special situations through carefully in order to eliminate excessive conventionality and intensify the spirit of competition in the combat work of the seamen. Already by its content, the simulation of battle and emergency damage required of the seamen nonstereotyped decisions,

boldness of thought, resourcefulness, and coolness in considering a situation. And even if at times there was some shortage of physical loads, the psychological atmosphere of the drills always approximated a real combat atmosphere to a high degree.

Today, we cannot limit ourselves to the acquisition of purely mechanical skills, whether this pertains to the precision and speed of calculations, observation of instruments, or the performance of certain operations. It is necessary to develop in the specialists the skill of a creative approach to the accomplishment of the tasks which arise before them. But creativity is awakened in those cases where conditions are present for the display of independence and when, in the training process, the seamen face difficulties the overcoming of which must be done independently, mobilizing knowledge, ability, and experience.

The lesson given to me at one time by Captain 1st Rank Yu. Lazarev was especially recalled during my years of service as a squadron specialist. For it was namely this staff officer who bears responsibility for the excellent state of training of the seamen in their specialties. The squadron specialist teaches subunit commanders to raise the quality of lessons and combat drills and exercises; the most interesting experience is concentrated in his hands. And each drill which the squadron specialist conducts with the officer personnel himself must be a model not only of methodological clarity and skillful organization, but also of an accurate psychological calculation from the viewpoint of being interesting, and this also means the productivity of the lesson.

Each long cruise requires of the ships crews a high level of combat readiness and the ability to accomplish the most difficult missions. And this means that the seamen must be irreproachably trained and ready to operate confidently in the situation which may develop suddenly, as occurs on well thought through drills which are conducted in a combat manner.

Competition Between Ships

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Zlydnev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "All Reserves--Into Action"]

[Text] "We are keeping our competitors in our wake, as they say," said political officer Yu. Korsakov with slyness in his voice when I became interested in the course of the competition between ships.

"Yes, this time we lost first place," agreed the secretary of the party organization of another ship, Captain 3d Rank Pushkin. "But we have not lost the hope of victory. The final checks will be soon. The finish will show...."

At the finish of the training year, both crews were to accomplish difficult firing missions. There would be new facts to compare the achievements of collectives equal in strength and capability.

The competitors visit one another. True, this does not happen as often as desired, but there is a telling reason for this--the ships are doing a lot of sailing. But when they stand side by side, such visits are regular.

It was learned that on the ship where BCh-2 [department 2] is headed by Captain 3d Rank A. Pushkin the seamen know their duties in accordance with the ship's bill a little better, and among the colleagues of officer Yu. Korsakov the technical style is a little better. However, establishing indices in which the competitors differ in one direction or another is still only half the matter. It is important to determine the reason why the leaders attained success, and what is even more important --to equip the competitor with leading experience effectively. This is how they proceeded on the ships.

The organization and procedure for the special training of the seamen were improved on both ships through common efforts, in the course of the exchange of experience: consultation posts were established for young seamen where masters of military affairs are on duty, and the system of special situations on drills was reviewed with consideration of battle's requirements. The most effective procedures for preparing weapons for action were worked out. Here, commanders of missile departments Captain 3d Rank A. Pushkin and Captain-Lieutenant V. Rychkov did much work. Together with the squadron specialist, they made a detailed analysis of where precious minutes are lost during the reception and check of a weapon, and they introduced a number of suggestions to condense the standards.

Good contacts also developed between the engineer officers of the ships. They regularly exchange experiences in the operation of assemblies and systems and in the organization of competition for the mastery of allied and second professions. Great credit here belongs to officer-communists V. Gradusov, T. Moskalenko, A. Isayev, and B. Buzin. On their initiative work of the technical study groups became more active on the ships and contests for the best specialist began to be conducted more often. Competitions of the seamen in allied specialties were organized for the first time. As a result, for example, all subordinates of master of military affairs and communist Warrant Officer [midman] V. Chigarin mastered an allied specialty while a member of the ship's party bureau, Warrant Officer N. Marchenko, confirmed the highest qualification in two specialties.

The atmosphere of good competition and comradely mutual assistance is also having a beneficial effect on the work of the rationalizers. Each of their suggestions is discussed publicly at conferences and in study groups. Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant S. Shalanin, who has been adjudged the best rationalizer in the unit, has to his credit 18 suggestions which improve the operating effectiveness of the mechanisms.

All this is good, But nevertheless, it must be said with all definiteness that the possibilities contained in the competition between ships are still far from completely utilized here.

Even now, for example, it is clear that not all officers and warrant officers who have the right to take the examinations for master of a combat qualification are ready to capture this position. When talk turns to this, they usually refer to the sluggishness of the master candidates themselves. But is it true that this sluggishness cannot be overcome? Talks alone which are similar to persuasion are not enough. It is necessary for commanders and political organizations of ships to increase exactingness toward people, propagandize the experience of the masters more widely and, as required by the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On further improvement in ideological and political-indoctrinational work," to use more completely the indoctrinational capabilities of socialist competition.

It was stated earlier how the exchange of experience between missilemen and the engineer officers is organized. Unfortunately this cannot be said about officers of other departments.

Both competitors win from the participation in the competition, but there is only one victor; someone nevertheless lags behind. Now the ship where the party organization is headed by officer A. Pushkin found itself "in the wake." He believes that the reason for lagging is hidden in the temporary drop in the activity and efficiency of a number of officers. Serious costs in the work style of the senior assistant, officer Yu. Malinin, had a noticeable effect on the moral climate in the collective, in his opinion. He was captivated by "dressing downs," hampered the initiative of people, and was indifferent toward their suggestions which were directed toward improving the state of affairs in the departments and toward increasing the effectiveness of the competition.

But now, the situation has changed: officer Yu. Malinin has been relieved of his post. And the task now consists of making effective use of the training year's remaining weeks and achieving the unconditional accomplishment of socialist obligations. It should be supposed that the staff and political section of the unit will help the crews of the competing ships to eliminate errors in organizing the exchange of experiences and will put into action in each department the still unused reserves for raising the combat ability of the seamen.

On the Escort Ship 'Sil'nyy'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Yelovskiy: "In the Channel of their Fathers"]

[Excerpts] Each time that the "Sil'nyy" crosses the imaginary line which connects the Taran and Rozeve beacons its crew, following naval tradition, salutes the heroes who died in the Baltic in battles for the motherland. The formation of the seamen in solemn silence stands stock-still on the quarterdeck. The man-of-war ensign is lowered to half mast. The high note of the bugle sounds.

Here, in the southern part of the Baltic, submarines under the command of I. Travkin, S. Bogorad, and A. Marinesko won brilliant victories.

When crossing the meridian of Syrve beacon, the men of the Baltic Fleet salute the victories of the older generation which were won over fascist convoys in the Irbenskiy straits. The destroyer "Sil'nyy" whose name our escort ship inherited became famous in these battles.

Yes, in turning to history we learn to live and perform our duty in accordance with the irreproachable moral norms of the frontline fighters and to fulfill the oath and protect the motherland just as sacredly as they did. All Soviet seamen follow this channel.

For example, Senior Lieutenant N. Troshin, commander of the antiaircraft battery, holds to the correct course. In the summer training period and period of competitions his battery confidently increases its ability. Here is a fresh example. A diving target was to be destroyed on an exercise. This mission was assigned to the group of ships. The radar operator, Petty Officer 2d Class P. Karp, was the first to detect and confidently track the "enemy."

It was very important not to become confused and lose the target during its separation from the airplane when the blip on the scope split. And here, the operators functioned irreproachably. With the target's approach to the range for opening fire, the battery of Senior Lieutenant N. Troshin was the first to hit it and obtained an excellent grade.

The development of the commander of the antiaircraft missile battery, Senior Lieutenant A. Brykin, is proceeding just as confidently. His father, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, is still serving in the Navy. The example of the wartime fighter inspires the young officer.

Recently, the first deputy commander of the fleet, Vice Admiral I. Kapitanets, went to sea on the "Sil'nyy." Two groups of ships competed in the search for the "enemy" submarine. The leader of the sonar team, Master Warrant Officer [master michman] A. Ryabokon', was the first to establish contact, and the miners, as always, worked clearly as they "destroyed" the target with depth-charge rockets. The admiral noted the traditionally high ability of the miners on the "Sil'nyy" and remained satisfied with the crew as a whole although he made several remarks about the work of the main control room.

The wartime chronicle of the destroyer "Sil'nyy" contains proof of the fact that the men of the engineering department (BCh-5) were distinguished by high ability and repair training. In the autumn of 1941, receiving major battle damage, the "Sil'nyy" was repaired twice under the most difficult conditions. At the shipyard, the enginemen of the destroyer were called "Stakhanovites." And Warrant Officer M. Khezina was called a professor of hull repair work.

Our seamen of BCh-5 are continuing this good fame. Not so long ago, the ship completed a successful ocean cruise, one can say, on economized engine capacity. Our engineer officers greatly extended the times between repairs. It is not by chance that the commander of BCh-5, master of military affairs officer Yu. Bozhkov--his rank is now engineer-captain-lieutenant--was awarded this rank ahead of schedule. The school of the "Sil'nyy" for the engineer officers is also felt in the professional "handwriting" of the group commanders. Engineer-Senior Lieutenants S. Romashechka, Yu. Morozov, and N. Pavlov are first-class specialists; they all are ready for independent control of a department.

It was my good fortune to command the "Sil'nyy" for several years. This was responsible, honorable, and difficult. A large role belongs to the glorious traditions of the ship in the fact that our escort ship is outstanding.

I wrote these lines on the eve of my departure to study at the Naval Academy. The officer who would take the escort ship "Sil'nyy" under his command was already known. He is Captain-Lieutenant A. Petrov. His grandfather took part in the revolution and went into the reserves in the rank of captain 1st rank. His father, Captain 1st Rank I. Petrov heads one of the fleet's services. His brother serves as the assistant commander of a cruiser. With the valorous attitude toward military duty, which has become a tradition with the Petrovs, it can be hoped that the young commander will hold the "Sil'nyy" in a reliable and proven channel. I wish him success with all my heart.

Aviation Crew Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Biryukov, squadron commander, 1st-class military pilot, Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet: "Crew Solidarity"]

[Text] When they say "Coordinated crew," they are thereby noting the outstanding ability and irreproachable smoothness in the work of the aviators in flight as well as, of course, the spiritual cohesion of the people and their loyalty to friendship and military comradeship. There are many excellent, coordinated crews in our unit which are capable of any most difficult combat-training mission. Of course, in the development of each of them they had their special features, and that perfected coordination in actions, the basis of which is made up of irreproachable discipline and mutual understanding, was not acquired at once.

Here, for example, is the crew where the commander is Captain Yuriy Borisov and the navigator is Senior Lieutenant Petr Shevchenko. Both are trained specialists. Although each one has, as they say, his own abilities and special features of character. Captain Borisov is a man of few words and punctual in everything which pertains to training and service. Evidently, at first his demandingness did not impress Petr Shevchenko, an energetic and emotional person, in everything. There was a breath of coolness in relations between them.

Once, after a landing on an alternate airfield the commander of the crew wanted to give the navigator an assignment. The latter, without listening to the end, flared up: "Why namely me? Did you find a scapegoat?" Captain Borisov gave the officer punishment. Then he reported this to me as squadron commander.

After a while, when the passions had died down somewhat, I called the navigator aside. I reminded him that inasmuch as the commander is personally responsible for the crew's preparedness for flight, in the interests of the service he is required to impose demandingness as called for by the regulations on his subordinate. It was here that the attempt was made to understand the reason why the officer did not behave quite tactfully in the conversation with his superior. The navigator reluctantly admitted that, he said, he was at fault and was hasty. In short, it was evident that the person did not completely realize his error. How to proceed here?

Consulting with the political officer, we talked with both of them. We tried to explain that there were no grounds for a falling out. The navigator simply must control and restrain his emotions better. And the commander of the crew must always consider the psychological nuances of joint work both on the ground and in the air and must not forget that even the very tone in which a remark is made plays an important role because it affects a person's attitude and, consequently, his readiness to operate with full return. Of course, we did not limit ourselves to a talk alone. We intensified the monitoring of the crew members' preparations for flights. At the same time, we did not lose sight of people's behavior and their ability to combine mutual demandingness with kindness and tact. It is to the honor of the officers that they displayed a sincere aspiration to eliminate the shortcomings which were present and they managed to establish correct mutual relations.

In the many-faceted work of rallying a crew as a military collective and molding a healthy moral atmosphere in it, we devote constant attention to spreading the experience of the best commander-teachers. Deep analysis and the graphic demonstration of their procedures and methods in flight training serve as good lessons for young officers. For example, they drew much that was instructive for themselves after becoming acquainted with the work style of the commander of an outstanding crew, Captain V. Reshetnikov. The experience of this military sniper pilot and skillful methodologist confirms convincingly that stable and high indices of the crew which he heads in training and service are ensured primarily by purposeful organizational and political-indoctrinational work with people.

From the way that officer Reshetnikov's subordinates prepare assiduously for each assignment in the air, one can already judge correctly the sense of each aviator's great responsibility for the assigned matter and the comradely assistance and mutual help for the attainment of the common success. Together they draw up the flight documentation and think out their actions in the air carefully and comprehensively, in the dynamics of the forthcoming assignment. This is a creative matter, and here anyone can express his opinion

apropos of the effectiveness of one or another combat maneuver. The commander of the crew properly corrects and objectively evaluates each sensible suggestion. He does not overlook even the slightest misunderstanding.

It is pleasant to fly in such a crew: clear rhythm, not one unnecessary word. If a commander's reminder is heard over the intercom, there are no angry undercurrents and the tone is even and calm, what is called approving. It is not for naught that they say about Reshetnikov that in flight he controls both the deeds and the attitude of the crew.

What distinguishes our leading crew commanders? Methodological skill, pedagogical tact, and the ability to win people over and instill in them a confidence in the successful accomplishment of the most difficult assignment. They maintain a healthy moral atmosphere and mutual understanding by personal example, one can say, by their line of behavior in service and in daily life. Take Captain Viktor Shopin as an example. The crew which he heads is a harmonious combat family. The aviators' families are friends, they spend their leisure time together, and a community of spiritual interests and aspirations draws them together.

To rally the crews, officers Reshetnikov and Shopin make active use of socialist competition. Making an objective evaluation of the actions of each specialist in flight and at his work site, at the same time they also give strict consideration to the aviator's observance of flight rules and his discipline and exemplary behavior in training and in service. They compare and contrast the results of their own crews and those of the competing crew scrupulously and, as they say, down to the smallest details.

One day, the crew of Major A. Barkevich, with which Captain Reshetnikov and his subordinates are competing, accomplished a flight mission under difficult conditions in an outstanding manner. And although he has the reputation as a master of flying affairs, this time it turned out a little worse for Reshetnikov. The commander analyzed exactly and self-critically why they functioned below their capabilities under identical conditions. Thoroughly analyzing the reasons for the shortcomings, he also stated what the crew should learn from the competing crew.

It happens that some leader, in defending verbally his successes in a competition, limits himself only to the fact that instead of painstaking organizational work he only reminds and "demands" that the lead not be lost. But officers Shopin and Reshetnikov seem to invite people to reflect and to raise questions for general advice: why, let us say, couldn't the navigator plan for a higher position--to struggle for the title of best in his profession in the squadron or in the regiment; or how the navigator-operator could prepare better and pass the forthcoming check of communication knowledge and skills with an excellent grade; or how the co-pilot could master piloting under difficult conditions more rapidly, and so forth. Specific ways for a further increase in the ability of each one and the attainment of common success are sought in such a confidential comradely exchange of opinions.

Questions of improving the coordination of the crews and the moral-psychological training of the aviators are deeply analyzed at post-flight critiques and during methodological lessons. Along with showing the experience of the leading commanders, here the causes of various errors are analyzed in detail so as to prevent them in the future when organizing the training and educational process. For there are no trifles in flying. The commander of the crew was not interested in the way his subordinates feel prior to takeoff, the navigator became unnecessarily nervous on the combat course, causing many unnecessary shifts in the aircraft's direction, the aviators did not work in a coordinated manner at some stage of the flight.... What was behind each such situation and what must be done to eliminate the shortcomings--an objective and useful conversation is conducted on all this.

We also devote great attention to the selection of crew personnel. Unquestionably, this problem is important. Of course, it is necessary to consider both the men's degree of ability and their individual characteristics. But, in my opinion, here we should hardly regard psychological compatibility as of paramount importance. Really, there are no people who are similar in every way in their character and their personal qualities. This means that it is the duty of the commander to improve the effectiveness and quality of indoctrinational work in molding in the men moral maturity and the best features of military comradeship and combat friendship.

The decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On further improvement in ideological and political-indoctrinational work," is a guide to action for all of us. In our unit, along with other means of ideological influence wide use is made of scientific-practical conferences, lecture cycles at which experienced commanders speak, and meetings with combat veterans.

But as yet not all reserves have been thrown into the matter. Why, let us say, couldn't a lecture bureau on the flight crew be organized in the Officers House in which questions on leading experience could be investigated in a theoretical as well as in a practical plane? In my opinion, this would contribute to the solidarity of the military collective. Everything depends on the clear creative determination and quality of measures conducted which must be closely linked with the practice of flight training and indoctrination.

Pipe-Laying Battalion

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Zlydnev, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "At the Eighth Channel"]

[Text] Breaking through the ashy-gray clouds, the sun caressed the ground. Thousands of tiny rainbows played in the droplets of moisture on the leaves of trees and on the rose-colored candles of the rose-bay.

Slowly drying out, the sailors' striped shirts were covered with soot. Sitting down on the thread of pipeline which had just been assembled, the seamen rested. Senior Seamen O. Kuchuk and A. Tsoller who had recently returned from a short leave were telling their comrades about their home towns. The chief of section, Junior Sergeant G. Perevozchikov, stood at a sharp bend of the stormy channel and estimated how to throw the pipes across it better and faster.

The channel which was named the eighth during the reconnaissance was narrow at this point, but swift. Here and there, half-sunken snags stuck out of the water. The swampy opposite bank was densely overgrown with low, clinging brush.

The instructor in pipeline equipment, Warrant Officer [praporshchik] A. Zverev, walked up to Junior Sergeant G. Perevozchikov. He has several hundred kilometers of installed pipes and dozens of channels and rivers which required of the pipeline layers high skill and precise calculations as well as bravery and sharpness to his credit. In the subunit, the warrant officer has the reputation of a jack of all trades and a demanding and thoughtful commander.

"We can't manage before evening, comrade warrant officer," said Perevozchikov. "The men are soaked through, tired, and it will be difficult to fasten the screw jacks in this rapid water. The river proved to be a surprise," and saying it, the junior sergeant measured the depth of the channel with a pole.

"Is this really the river? The river is ahead. And I think we can get by without the jacks. We'll adapt those snags there instead of them. They are reliably fastened to the bottom, I checked. All this should be reported to the company commander, and it seems that he has arrived over there...."

A pipe-carrying truck stopped near the group of resting seamen and an agile officer, short in height, jumped lightly from its cab. This was the company commander, Captain I. Mikulyak.

"Are we drying or baking?" he gaily asked the seamen. "I come to you with good news. The battalion received a high grade for the march. The command is confident that we will also accomplish our primary mission successfully, too."

...The pipeline layers rose at dawn. Brief assemblies--and the column of vehicles left the post. Using their wealth of experience, the battalion commander, Major of Technical Service V. Yefremov, his deputy for technical affairs, Major N. Stepchenko, and the chief engineer, Captain of Technical Service V. Dynnikov, organized the march clearly and achieved complete secrecy of the column's movement.

Despite the difficult roads and bad weather, the column arrived at the designated point at the established time. And soon carefully camouflaged tent

cantonments equipped with everything necessary for the normal life of the men under field conditions sprang up at the disposition areas of the companies. The veteran of the subunit, Warrant Officer Yu. Karkhanin, displayed administrative smartness and flexibility here.

They began to work at once. And they immediately encountered difficulties. There were many of them: Heavily broken terrain which abounded with numerous channels and swampy soil sectors, continuous rain and a dank wind, a great distance from the supply base and, finally, rigid times for laying the pipeline. Much effort was required to organize the work clearly. Socialist competition between subunits and between individual specialists which was initiated under the slogan, "High reliability for the line," played its mobilizing role here.

The results of the competition were summed up at the end of each day, and in the morning a red flag was raised at the tent where battalion headquarters was located in honor of the leading subunit. The name of the platoon commander, Senior Lieutenant V. Bystrov, could be read on a small plate fastened to the flag pole more often than the others. As a rule, his subordinates exceed the daily assignments with excellent quality of the work. Nor do the leaders forget about their competitor in the competition--the platoon which is commanded by Lieutenant G. Nefedov. It so happened that in this platoon the majority of the men still do not possess sufficient experience in work under field conditions. Therefore, at times they get "steamed up." And then Senior Lieutenant Bystrov's subordinates, having accomplished their assignment, arrive to help their friendly competitors.

The secretary of the party organization, Captain I. Mikulyak, does not miss an opportunity to inform the men of the successes attained in a day or week, to cite those who especially distinguished themselves, and to publicly criticize those who are lagging behind.

Today, there was no one to reproach for lagging and the officer, having announced the grade for the march, issued the latest newspapers to the seamen and commented on the news published in them.

Warrant Officer A. Zverev sits down next to the captain and tells him his plan for forcing the eighth channel.

"Operate just as you proposed the matter," says the officer to the warrant officer. "But don't forget about safety measures and work style. Don't contaminate the channel and don't cut the trees and brush. As you know, the grade is reduced for this, you see...."

"Take places!" the warrant officer orders.

The seamen join the pipes quickly. A rubber sealing ring, steel sleeve, several turns with a box wrench-brace--and the nuts are tightened and the joint is ready. The first section is laid on a snag which is sticking out of the water. The next one--also. Step by step, overcoming the strong current, the pipe-layers advance toward the opposite bank.

The wind from the sea grows stronger. The sky is again densely curtained by the clouds. It began to rain.

"Now we have a customary situation here," jokes the warrant officer as he dons his work jacket. "Things will go more cheerfully...."

After several hours both the eighth channel and the swampy sector of the zone near the bank were left far behind. The steel thread of the pipeline stretched along the steep slope of a cone-shaped hill beyond which is located the combat equipment which is experiencing an acute need for fuel. And it arrived in time because the men of the excellent battalion worked with full exertion, as if in actual battle. Exceeding the standard, the pipe-laying battalion received an excellent grade.

Shipboard Maintenance Officer Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Engr-Capt 1st Rank B. Kalistratov, staff officer: "A Line in a Diploma"]

[Text] The commander of the ship invited Engineer-Captain 3d Rank A. Kuznetsov to the commanding officer's battle station. The day before, he had been ordered to explain the reason for the breakdown of a mechanism. The allotted time had passed but the report did not follow. The engineer officer arrived in a worried state.

"Well, what happened?"

"A serious malfunction...."

"Who is at fault?"

"I missed it, the watch slipped up."

"I demand that you fix the mechanism at once!"

The engineer officer tried to execute the order which he had received. But he did not have enough knowledge, ability, or engineering know-how.

This is not today's example. But it has not lost its instructiveness. It is remembered on the ship and presented at conferences and lessons of the engineer officers. They learn from it the possible consequences of technical incompetence of a ship's officer.

Today, not one ship and not one department on a ship accomplishes its missions without the active participation of engineers having the appropriate specialization. The need for engineers is caused objectively--equipment is

becoming more complex, weapons are being improved, and the content of training missions and duration of cruises are increasing. It is proper that now our higher naval schools are issuing the diploma of military engineer to their graduates.

The line in the diploma concerning the award of the qualification of military engineer to an officer imposes many requirements. It is a unique calling card of a lieutenant which he presents upon arrival on a ship. It works for his authority even when he has done nothing yet for the crew or subunit. He receives the special attention of the commander of the ship who hopes that such an officer will learn the contemporary complex equipment and weapons thoroughly and in a short time. The commander of the ship is correct to count on obtaining an intelligent leader of lessons in his specialty from a young engineer officer. He sees in the young engineer officer a competent operator who will provide the ship with power and the assigned speed under any sailing conditions.

I have the occasion to do much sailing on service duty, to see young ships engineers in fact, and to teach and indoctrinate them. As a rule, they are competent specialists and people who are devoted to the sea and ships service. In my opinion, Engineer-Lieutenant A. Kurkovich is one of them.

Upon completion of the higher naval school, he was appointed commander of the engine group on a large missile ship. It was not necessary to hurry him in assuming his post. He received the authority to control the subunit twice as fast as called for by the documents. But this alone is not enough to justify the entry in the diploma. In the end, the main task of ships engineers is to ensure the reliable operation of equipment under any sailing conditions, to train and indoctrinate his subordinate specialists skillfully, and to be a fervent advocate of a high technical style on the ship.

During a very strained and long voyage, the output parameters of one of the engines began to change unexpectedly. The commander of the engineering department (BCh-5), Engineer-Captain 3d Rank V. Sitnikov, called on Kurkovich (then an engineer-lieutenant) first to disclose the reasons for the malfunction and then to work on its elimination. And right here the young engineer's grasp and his ability to analyze and find the correct technical solution were disclosed. Even then, it became clear that with time Kurkovich would become an outstanding engineer officer. And to be sure, with the passage of a few years of service he received authority to control a department and became a master of military affairs. On the next long cruise the young officer performed the duties of commander of BCh-5 successfully.

Great in the confident professional growth of the officer is the service of his immediate chief and commander of BCh-5, Engineer-Captain 3d Rank V. Sitnikov. But is each of the commanders of subunits able to boast about good specialized training of his subordinates, to include repair training, as can Sitnikov? Unfortunately, no. But why? Who is at fault here?

The department commanders themselves are among the first. Far from all of them are able to utilize the time for the planned repair of ships under shipyard conditions where it is possible to adopt the experience of the professional repairmen. As a rule, in training their subordinates such leaders use only the analyses of standard malfunctions which are compiled by the staffs and recommendations for their elimination under cruise conditions. But this is insufficient. The systematic repair training of ships engineers is necessary.

Much depends here on the work style of the squadron specialists on the ships. It happens that with the appearance of any, at times trivial malfunction the young engineer requests the assistance (to put it simply, come, he says, and do it) of the squadron specialist. And the staff officer visits the ship, and there he begins with what is equipped with a wrench, screw driver, or soldering iron--with what is necessary--and by the sweat of his brow he does what falls within the direct duties of the ship's engineer and his subordinates.

Individual ships commanders have also become accustomed to this: it is more than a guarantee that everything will be done reliably. This work style of some squadron specialists, in particular before long cruises, unfortunately, does not cause the proper censure in the staffs.

On a long cruise from which I returned recently, an officer of the cruise staff, Engineer-Captain 2d Rank A. Aladkin, was invited on board the ship: the engineers had encountered an unforeseen difficulty. One of the compartments in the holds was periodically flooded with water. It was learned on the spot that the ship's engineers didn't even try to find the reasons why water entered the hold. "We don't know what the matter is," was all they could answer. It is said correctly that the ones who don't know have a headache while those who are unable hurt their hands. Engineer-Captain 2d Rank Aladkin found the reason and eliminated the malfunction, that is, he did what the ship's engineers should have done.

Is it surprising that with such an approach toward matters dependent attitudes appear among some ships engineers? They do not add to their store of technical knowledge and do not accumulate experience in repair training.

I should like to turn attention to one more phenomenon. On arriving on a ship, some young officers with an engineering diploma limit the range of their concerns to the operation of the mechanisms and systems and avoid daily indoctrinational work with people. It's as if they are too busy to think of how to develop in the seamen a love for equipment and weapons and punctuality in implementing the requirements of the Navy Regulations. They say that it is the business of the engineer to be occupied with the equipment while the indoctrination of the seamen is the concern of the political officers. Here the ships commanders and party organizations that are called upon to arm the young officers with an integrated approach to the entire matter of training and indoctrinating the seamen have something to think about.

The ships engineer must constantly supplement and expand his knowledge. Meanwhile, some of them quickly forget about the line in the diploma and about their primary purpose--to be the carrier of engineering thought on the ship and the fighter for a high technical style. With such officers, theoretical knowledge often proves to be lower after several years of service than it was upon completion of school. This does not permit them to find correct solutions when, for example, at sea it is necessary to accomplish repair work of increased difficulty, calculate the use of power resources, fuel, material substitutes, and so forth. At times, the change over to the ranks of "pure" practical workers becomes a serious hindrance when the question is raised concerning the advancement of an officer to new ships where complex equipment requires not only practical experience, but also excellent theoretical training. If such an assignment takes place, then the engineer often takes a long time to learn the job or even fails to cope with his new duties.

This is exactly what happened with Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant V. Korobnichenko. Advanced to a post with a promotion, he just could not understand the complex equipment. It was necessary to return him to his former place of service.

At the same time, conditions for the improvement of engineers are to be found on each ship. Its paths are well known. They are the active participation in planned special training, independent study, and rationalizer's search. Many utilize these possibilities completely. They develop and introduce innovations which increase the reliability of equipment operation, reduce expenditures of fuel and electric power, and lengthen the periods between repairs.

The most gifted and industrious engineers of the ship element develop and substantiate new procedures for the employment of weapons and investigate ways to increase the distances of detection and accuracy in destroying targets and the effectiveness in using ships power plants.

Commanders and staffs should work more objectively on the training and indoctrination of engineers. There is a reason for a more exacting approach to the formation of the socialist obligations of officers who have, let us say, the qualification of a 1st-class specialist and confirm it from year to year without special efforts. Squadron specialists and commanders of ships are required to make more active use of the mobilizing capabilities of competition in raising masters of military affairs and engineers of the highest qualification.

The line in the diploma of a ships officer which states that he is a military engineer requires him to work in an inspired manner, creatively, and at full strength on mastering equipment and weapons in the name of the further raising of combat readiness. This is his highest duty and calling.

On a Minesweeper

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Capt 3d Rank A. Glagolev, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "For Economy and Thrift in Large and Small"]

[Text] The situation on the cruise became more difficult and the minesweeper's return to base was delayed. The ship's commander assembled his assistants to hear their reports about supplies. There was sufficient water and fuel. But there was enough bread remaining for one meal. It was right here that the zealous attitude of the ship's administrative officer, Warrant Officer [michman] I. Protopopov, toward his service was manifested. Anticipating the possibility of a delay at sea, he ordered the preparation of biscuits from the bread which remained after feeding the men, and he did so in a timely manner. Thanks to the warrant officer's thrift, the crew could remain at sea for the required time and accomplish its combat-training missions.

This example is extremely typical of this collective. The following principle has been strongly confirmed on the minesweeper: economize in the small, gain in the large. By the way, it evidently would be more correct to say that in the struggle for thrift there are no trifles at all. Here, everything is essential, and everything has the most direct bearing on the maintenance of the ship's high level of combat readiness.

Warrant Officer N. Samara devised a device which was quite simple. He made special drip pans to collect used oil and fuel. And what an effect the innovation provided! The repeated use of the valuable products became possible after the appropriate purification, order in the holds improved, and the ship's fire safety was increased. What is also valuable is the fact that Samara made and introduced the improvement without any "promptings from above," on his own initiative.

There are many such useful initiatives in the collective. And all because the ship's commander, communists, and Komsomol activists are objectively engaged in the organization of the competition for economy and thrift and they are attaining an increase in the return from its indoctrinational effect.

At one time, things were not getting on well with the engine personnel. They planned high goals in the struggle for economy, but they did not go beyond this. Fuel not only was not saved, but it was even overexpended.

It cannot be said that the people displayed negligence and squandered it. The causes were to be found in something else: sometimes the engineers permit the diesel to overheat just a little, sometimes they permit a small leakage of oil, and sometimes they even permitted some "minor" violation of the engine's operating conditions, and the "minutia" turned into many kilograms of unjustified losses.

This occurred because in the engineer department obligations were assumed in the struggle for thrift only for the long term, but the contribution each seaman was to make to their accomplishment at his battle station, not over the course of a year but today, tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, was not clear.

The situation changed when a chart of the competition for economy between engineer shifts appeared in the crew's compartment and when the commander of the department, Engineer-Lieutenant V. Ivanov, began to enter data from each watch on it. Of course, the bustle at it increased. It was necessary to calculate how much fuel was expended and with which speed of the ship by one or another machine, how much is obtained per mile on the average.... But such arithmetic immediately began to provide a substantial return. Those who formerly listened to the commander's demands with a sceptical smile and who thought whether, they say, it is worthwhile to talk about so many grams of fuel are now participating most actively in the movement of the thrifty.

Thus, on the eve of the last departure for sea, the engineers headed by the commander of the engine room, 1st Class Petty Officer S. Zemlyanykh, carefully adjusted all control and measuring equipment and placed additional sealing on the pipes. This contributed to a reduction in the unproductive consumption of fuel.

Of course, the struggle for economy and thrift presumes not only well-organized accounting but also increased demandingness toward each serviceman. In order to learn to economize in things large and small, one should be exacting in both large and small things. Toward oneself, toward comrades, and toward subordinates.

One day, the following incident occurred on the minesweeper. The damage control party showed up well at a routine drill. The seamen accomplished all norms successfully. Imagine their amazement when they saw that they had received a low grade on the competition chart.

The leader of the drills proceeded in this manner because after completing the training the damage-control tools were not put in the authorized places. This could lead to their damage.

One of the seamen considered such demandingness captious. Then it was decided to speak about this case at party and Komsomol meetings. The discussions turned out to be pointed and based on principle. In the course of them the men came to a single opinion: the higher the demandingness in grading the results of the competition, the better.

The following rule was firmly established among the crew: no matter how well a seaman responds on lessons, he will not receive a high grade if he has a slipshod attitude toward wearing the uniform, and however high the training ability of one section or another may be, it will not become outstanding if the post is in disorder and the equipment is carelessly maintained.

This is the law. The law thanks to which the minesweeper's crew firmly holds first place in the unit in the competition for economy and thrift and marches among the leaders toward the completion of the training year.

On the 'Minsk'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank G. Savichev: "The Coordinates of Authority"]

[Text] This ship is striking not only by its dimensions and the power of its mechanisms and weapons, but also by its external contour and architecture. It is not by chance that during cruises on open oceans foreign warships which are encountered going in the opposite direction report: "Your ship is beautiful."

Yes, the antisubmarine cruiser "Minsk" is beautiful. Beautiful not only externally, but also in its interior appearance. The wardrooms, messes, cabins, and crew's accommodations are finished with taste. Decorative lattices, panels, and hundreds of canvases of famous Soviet artists seem to crown the perfection of the equipment with the perfection of high art.

The cruiser embodies the latest achievements in the field of Soviet ship- and aircraft-building. Yes, aircraft-building too, because the "Minsk" is able to carry jet aircraft. And its crew consists of not only seamen, but also pilots.

And the commander of the cruiser commands both. This sketch is also devoted to him.

Squall

Nothing predicted bad weather. True, as often happens in the tropics, giant flashes of summer lightning flashed every now and then all around in the

impenetrable, inky darkness. And then the clouds and outlines of the near shore were visible for an instant. The sight was impressive. And no one assumed that after a while genuine confusion would begin.

The cruiser stood in open roads, firmly gripping the bottom with the powerful blades of its anchor. Its massive hull, gleaming lacquer-like in the deck illumination, seemed to be as steadfast as a rock. But suddenly a wind of terrible force struck the starboard. The ship listed sharply. At the same instant lightning flashed. Not over there, somewhere at a distance, but quite near, gliding along the superstructure and the deck.

The downpour came in torrents. Streams of water conclusively covered everything around. The summoning sound of the bells of the loud battle could not be heard on the upper deck. Here it whistled, echoed, and splashed. But it was clear to the seamen: at such moments the place of each crew member is at his battle station.

Reports were already arriving at the navigation bridge. Bulbs of the intercoms flashed as they demanded attention, and bells tinkled as they called the officer of the watch for communications. And he, deafened by the roar of furious elements, rushed from one handset to another in a confused manner, lost himself in shouting, and at times issued contradictory orders. Such a skirmish with the ocean was the first in his life. A one-on-one skirmish. The watch officer's nervousness was also transmitted to others. This is why the atmosphere on the bridge was far from calm. But suddenly, it somehow changed elusively. The lack of confidence was replaced by confidence, and anxiety--by calm: the voice of the cruiser's commander, Captain 1st Rank Viktor Aleksandrovich Gokinayev, rang out on the bridge.

"Navigator, follow our position," he issued his first order. And then he switched over to communication with another station. "How's the anchor cable, boatswain?"

"Anchor cable is taught. It points to the starboard."

And the wind rushed at the ship ever more furiously, ever more violently. It no longer whistled in the superstructure but growled, choking with the downpour. The weather forecasters continuously reported its force and direction. They changed. And this was worst of all because the commander could not say with confidence how events would develop. But nevertheless, he was required to anticipate their development.

"Boatswain, pay out the cable."

Giving this order, Gokinayev immediately called the power and damage control central to the intercom and he ordered the commander of the engineering department, Engineer-Captain 2d Rank Aleksey Nikolayevich Gorovtsov:

"Put the main engines into operation as soon as possible."

"Aye, aye, comrade commander."

A report from the navigator: position is changing. The ship is drifting toward the shore.

There is nothing more unpleasant than this report. It meant that the anchor was no longer holding and the cruiser was being carried to the shore by the wind. Thoughts flashed across the commander's mind like lightning: "What to do? Cast the second anchor? But the wind is constantly changing direction. It seems to be screwed into the ocean. And the ship is turning. No, it is better to wait a while before casting the second anchor."

Weighing all the pro's and con's and calculating the speed with which the ship was drifting, Gokinayev said to himself: "The main thing is not to hurry. There is still time to adopt the necessary measures."

"Boatswain, pay out the anchor cable more energetically."

He based his entire estimate on the preparedness of the personnel in the engineering department. Will they be able to put the engines into operation in the shortest possible time?

As always, the engineers did not let him down. Soon Gorovtsov reported: "Ready to get under way." The commander glanced at his watch. The standard was considerably exceeded.

"Good," he answered and immediately gave the order to get under way. The drifting stopped. The squall was broken.

Later, when everything had ended, when the wind was calm and the stars were shining, Gokinayev said as he addressed the crew:

"Today you proved that you are excellent seamen. Thank you!"

No one gave him a grade, but nevertheless the commander of the cruiser showed himself to be the most competent seaman on that stormy night.

A Duel

Naval seamen call such a battle a meeting engagement. The ships, separated by a considerable expanse of sea, were moving toward one another. The equipment for the detection and for processing data of all types was already working at full capacity and the ships, feeling for each other with electron beams, were preparing to launch mutual strikes.

The skill in conducting such an engagement also consists exactly in launching these strikes in good time and at the "enemy's" most vulnerable point.

On board the cruiser "Minsk" was an energetic admiral, a person with a sharp mind who is sometimes inclined toward sarcasm. During preceding cruises, while observing Gokinayev's actions, he suddenly exclaimed one day:

"Most sincere thanks to you!"

"From whom, comrade admiral?" Viktor Aleksandrovich was surprised.

"From the enemy," the answer followed. "For clumsy actions."

Descending from the bridge, Gokinayev analyzed his decisions thoroughly and was convinced that they really were not the best.

And here is a new exercise. The commander of the cruiser "Minsk" prepared for it with special thoroughness. He also considered all the remarks and advice which the admiral had given him on the preceding exercise. And this advice was worth remembering. "The primary task of the commander of any ship," taught the admiral, "is always to be focused in on events which are taking place on the ship and off it. The commander is required to meditate, but he must also act, act, and act. As regards the watch officers, neither should they lag behind events. It is their sacred duty to 'obtain' the situation and make their suggestions actively."

On the day when the meeting engagement entered its decisive phase, the watch officers of the "Minsk" operated extremely actively. The other officers also displayed the same activity. The navigator approached Gokinayev:

"Comrade commander, I think we are in an area which is especially dangerous."

Requesting hydrological data on the area, Gokinayev bent over the map: yes, the depth, and the hydrology, and the time of day and weather--everything indicates that it is here that submarines may undertake attacks. Right then, he approached the admiral:

"I recommend sending up helicopters."

It seems to be simple--give the command to the helicopters to take off, and they will execute it at once. But you see, it was necessary to perform important work prior to this; Gokinayev himself had to study the aviation which was entrusted to him and be imbued with the sense that the aviation on the cruiser is not a "side horse" and not an appendage, but a powerful weapon.

When the helicopters, jumping off the flight deck like ping-pong balls from a table, disappeared in the distance, Viktor Aleksandrovich began to await results not without excitement. And it should be said that this time the helicopter men of the "Minsk" functioned clearly: "enemy" submarines were discovered in good time and destroyed.

But a great number of other problems were to be solved: how to avoid an "enemy" surface strike and how to attack him successfully ourselves? With what weapons? Aviation, torpedoes, missiles?

In the solution of these problems, an exceptionally large role is played by the ship commander's conviction which is based on a deep knowledge of combat weapons and on a competent analysis of the situation. The "Minsk" launched missiles and then launched jet aviation which inflicted the final blow.

Style

The agenda for the party session was important. The report was given by member of the party committee and commander of the cruiser "Minsk," Captain 1st Rank Gokinayev. The indoctrination of young officers was discussed.

The report was dynamic and saturated with examples, facts, and comparisons which, it seemed, exhaustively illuminated the subject. But nevertheless, when Gokinayev had finished the representative of the senior political organ who was present at the session asked:

"Here you said that the work style of commanders and political officers in the course of indoctrinating young officers should be active. How should this be understood?"

Viktor Aleksandrovich glanced at those present. He met the glance of Captain-Lieutenant Yuriy Milent'yevich Polyakov, navigator of the cruiser. He thought to himself: "Maybe I can tell about Polyakov, about how his development proceeded."

The commander remembers well the navigator's first steps on the ship. One was struck by his business-like efficiency and the seriousness of his approach to the solution of problems. It was just these qualities of Polyakov which suggested a bold idea to Gokinayev: and why not train the young officer for independent handling of the cruiser?

The squadron specialist waved his hands amicably:

"A captain-lieutenant to handle such a colossus as the 'Minsk' independently?!"

But the commander of the ship did not retreat from his idea. He decided to train the navigator personally. He reasoned as follows: "Examinations will change the minds of the sceptics."

But what does it mean to pass the examinations for the independent handling of a cruiser? It is even difficult to imagine it. The fact that this ship is tremendous, that it is really a colossus, and that it is therefore difficult to control it is one side of the matter. The other is that it is saturated with the most modern equipment. Moreover, it is intended to carry aircraft. The commander controlling the ship independently must know all

of this and must understand everything correctly. It is his duty not only to steer the ship over the boundless ocean expanses, in so doing overcoming bad weather, but also to be the main authority on the ship in the matter of using any weapons and operating the equipment.

Polyakov began to prepare for the examinations, but not without some doubts.

Gokinayev did not spare his time when it was necessary to help the young officer to understand one question or another.

After a time, the commander of the cruiser turned to the command with the official request to give Polyakov the examinations.

"And you are stubborn," said one of the squadron specialists, and Gokinayev understood that Polyakov would not have an easy time.

By the way, the skepticism of some of the officers began to dissipate as Polyakov passed one examination after another: five, five, five....

And the admiral himself gave the examination in the practical handling of the ship. And he remained very satisfied with Polyakov. And later, by now in an official order, it was stated that he was permitted to take independent control of a cruiser.

Viktor Aleksandrovich Gokinayev glanced once again at all those present at the party committee. No, he did not begin to tell the story of Polyakov, for in his practice of indoctrinational work with young officers there are many such stories. But he answered the question as follows:

"An active style, in my opinion, is a creative approach to indoctrination. One must trust the young officers more and place them more boldly in those situations where they can display themselves more completely."

Submarine Officer Training

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank D. Chumak: "Fifth Attack"]

[Text] The sea was storming. Captain 2d Rank A. Chadovich stood in the submarine's fairwater and awaited permission to dive. Distant stars twinkled over his head, and waves rumbled violently against the ship's side. The deserted night sea was disturbed from time to time by the flashes of the searchlights of ships which were passing on the horizon. The commander accompanied them with an indifferent glance and again lived with the expectation of working in the depths.

He selected the initial point for diving himself--as far as possible from the pulses of the all-seeing and all-hearing "enemy" locators. In essence,

it was also the initial point of his concept for the forthcoming training battle: to keep from being detected prior to the start of the search of the group of landing ships, and then--noiselessly, at low speed, to break through the line of antisubmarine defense undetected; with the precise classification of the contact, to attack the "enemy" at maximum possible speed.

"That's how Ponomarev proceeds, and he is lucky each time," thought Chadovich as if convincing himself that he is proceeding correctly.

It is not by chance that Chadovich recalled Captain 2d Class A. Ponomarev, his fellow-serviceman, at these tense minutes before the search and attack. Ponomarev is a master of the torpedo strike. Without copying him blindly, Chadovich adopted the best from his colleague's practice on critiques of exercises, lessons, and drills. He did it with partiality and with great interest. There were ponderous reasons for this.

In the submarine force, they reflected for a long time on how to organize paired competition between ship commanders more effectively. Its old forms were no longer useful and it proved difficult to find new ones. The staff and political section conducted a commanders conference. The suggestion was received to compete for the title, "Commander--master of torpedo strikes." Criteria which the claimant for the title of master must meet were worked out. Their basis was the level of the commander's tactical training, the quality and number of drills of the ship's combat sections, and the quality of accomplishment of combat exercises.

The flagship's combat section became a unique base of leading experience. Lessons and drills were conducted here by staff officers Captains 2d Rank L. Kirsanov and V. Snopikov, experienced ship commanders.

Young commanders are now permitted to accomplish torpedo firing at a real target only after the accomplishment of a certain number of training attacks in the torpedo firing trainer room with excellent grades. As a result, the intensity and effectiveness of training of the submariners on shore increased sharply and the quality of training of commanders for the accomplishment of combat exercises at sea was raised.

Captain 2d Class A. Ponomarev--the commander of an excellent submarine and participant in many long cruises--was declared the first master of torpedo strikes in the force. Ponomarev was honored ceremoniously. The political section generalized his experience. Ponomarev's photograph and a photo of the seamen from the combat section were placed in a special display which reflects the course of the commanders' competition.

Captain 2d Rank A. Chadovich was sincerely happy with the success of his comrade, really envied him, and in the inmost recesses of his heart he already nurtured the thought of also deserving the right to be called master of torpedo strikes. But this proved to be beyond his capabilities in the last training year. The ship's combat section was renewed. The mine-torpedo subunit was headed by a young officer, Lieutenant A. Lozovoy. Some

sonarmen did not have enough experience, either. Chadovich felt this very acutely during a torpedo attack at the finish of the training year--then the crew lost its previously won positions.

The failure served as a good lesson. For this training year, Captain 2d Rank Chadovich assumed high personal obligations including--to become master of torpedo strikes and lead the submarine out among the excellent. In the summer training period, his crew accomplished four torpedo firings for record and all tactical and other missions only with high grades. And now the next fifth attack was to take place, the "prestige" attack, as it was defined in the headquarters: from the results of the attack, in accordance with the provisions for the competition of commanders Chadovich could become master of torpedo strikes.

"Granted" for diving was received at about midnight. The submarine set its course to close with the "enemy." Captain 2d Rank Chadovich summoned to the central station the officers on whom the success of the attack depended to a tremendous degree--the chief of the radio service, Senior Lieutenant V. Zabela, and the mine officer, Lieutenant A. Lozovoy. The officers reported laconically on the readiness of the sections and equipment for the search and attack of the "enemy."

Chadovich thought with satisfaction of how Lieutenant Lozovoy had grown during his year in the post of commander of Department 3. Standing before him now was a submariner who had been tested by cruises, a leading watch officer and rated specialist. Interchangeability had been completely worked out in all combat sections of the department and the basic and alternate methods of firing had been mastered. Using the example of Lieutenant Lozovoy, the commander was convinced again how much the competition of the officers provides when it is organized specifically and efficiently.

Prior to the establishment of contact with the landing ships, Captain 2d Rank Chadich was occupied with a preliminary analysis of the situation in the area of the forthcoming battle and a forecast of its possible changes. At this time, his senior assistant handled the ship.

At this time, Senior Lieutenant Zabela again came to the commander. From the reports of the sonarmen, Captain 2d Rank Chadovich already knew that the first contact with the "enemy" had been established and, much as he regretted it, thought that the young officer had come to brag about this success of his subordinates. However, Zabela did not come for this. He held a sheet with the surface situation plotted on it.

After last year's failure, Senior Lieutenant V. Zabela together with Warrant Officer [michman] V. Pluzhnikov philosophized for a long time on the creation of a screen of the surface situation. And they created it. Now, the sonarmen ceased to be passive "listeners" to the voices of the underwater depth. Each of them strived to think tactically and to have a visual perception of what is occurring there, above, where the "enemy" is maneuvering.

The screen of the situation helps this in a fair way. Zabela now came with it to the central station in order to express his assumption concerning the possible location of the main target.

Later, in reflecting on this seemingly insignificant fact, Chadovich noted behind it something greater than simply exceptional initiative. In the course of competition the officers grow morally, and each one worries not only for the success of his subunit, but also for the matters of the entire ship. Both the crew's combat coordination and its moral solidarity become stronger. And this, perhaps, is the main source of all preceding outstanding attacks. And now, having heard Zabela, the commander noted laconically that his suggestions are "very much to the point."

Having complete and reliable data on the surface situation, Captain 2d Rank Chadovich was able to exploit what seemed to him to be the protracted maneuver of the "enemy" ships on the next tack and guided the submarine through the antisubmarine line unnoticed.

If Chadovich, who now was more than completely occupied, could have glanced at himself from the side and compared himself with the commander who, at the end of the last year, just could not completely understand the surface situation as he went into the attack, then except for the outward similarity he would not be able to discover any other similarity. Now, the commander was well grounded in his analysis of changes in the formation of "enemy" ships, and he took as the basis of his concept not only the reports of the sonarmen but also all other information which formerly was considered unessential. He involved the entire combat section in the working out of the optimum decision, noting with satisfaction that the majority of the officers who make it up think unusually and creatively.

They attacked from the depth at midnight. After the accurate destruction of the main target, the submariners launched several strikes at the escort ships. Each of them was marked by high skill. A staff officer who was on board the submarine came to this opinion. But Captain 2d Rank Chadovich waited with excitement to see how this engagement would be evaluated by the commander in chief of the Navy, Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov.

The commander in chief evaluated the fifth attack as creative and extremely instructive from the standpoint of a night engagement of a single submarine with a group of surface ships superior in armament and he awarded the commander inscribed naval binoculars.

...Returning from headquarters where he was congratulated with the title of master of torpedo strikes and with winning the competition of commanders, Captain 2d Rank Chadovich stole a glance at a display. His portrait had now been placed in the spot where the photograph of Captain 2d Class Ponomarev had hung quite recently. And alongside, a group photo of the ship's combat section.

Escort Ship 'Razitel'nyy'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Balashov, commander of escort ship "Razitel'nyy," Red Banner Black Sea Fleet: "The Crew--A Combat Family"]

[Text] Seeing that the work clothing and boots of Seaman Viktor Boyko were soiled with mazut, Petty Officer 1st Class Viktor Dedushchenko did not try to find out why the seaman had such an appearance and the source of the mazut which suddenly appeared in the hold. He undertook to "educate" the seaman with a rush, sometimes employing expressions here which a person who respects himself and other people would never begin to use.

The commander of the engineer department, Engineer-Captain Lieutenant M. Verpakhovskiy, who dropped into the hold, calmed Dedushchenko. Well, he calmed him but did not report to me what had happened.

In general, even earlier at times I formed the impression that as yet not everything is in order on the ship in regard to the interrelationships between seamen, but neither I nor my former deputy for political affairs, Captain 3d Rank V. Balibardin (he is now a student at the military-political academy) had exact facts available. Therefore, we were not specific when engaged in rallying the collective on the ship and individual work with people was conducted poorly.

Later, it was learned that the violators of order as prescribed by the regulations sometimes were concealed not only by Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant M. Verpakhovskiy, but also by other subunit commanders and crew chiefs. But certainly! For behind each instance of discipline violations and non-military mutual relations stood their own omissions in indoctrinational work with the seamen. At times, their false notion concerning the honor of the serviceman pushed them toward bargaining with their conscience.

The incident described above forced us to be occupied with questions of interrelations between the ship's crew members in real earnest and in a different manner. Many shortcomings were discovered, and most of all--in officer M. Verpakhovskiy's department. Here, the subunit commanders virtually never talked with the newcomers who had arrived on the ship, and the officers did not know who was called up and from where, in what family he was brought up and what inclinations and enthusiasms he has. Even after the lapse of two weeks from the newcomers' arrival on the ship the commanders, it turned out, still did not know their names. Moreover, in considerable measure many officers transferred the task of training and indoctrination work with the youth to the petty officers, among whom there were people who do not possess either sufficient methodological skill nor pedagogical tact and who were nominated for such duties at one time but hardly in accordance with the single principle: a good specialist.

All these errors and omissions in indoctrinational work with people became a subject of a serious and detailed conversation at party and Komsomol meetings on the ship and at conferences of officers, warrant officers [michman], petty officers, and seamen in the last year of service. I reported on the status of indoctrinational work, on my personal omissions, and about shortcomings in the work of the ship's officers in rallying the collective to the political section and turned to the unit commander with the request to deprive V. Dedushchenko of his petty officer rank, while the Komsomol committee gave him a severe reprimand.

Yes, I'll honestly say that this was a difficult time for all of us. Of course, I may be asked: and where were you earlier, why were you occupied with questions of rallying the collective in real earnest only now? The question is completely reasonable. I can answer it in only one way: our collective had still hardly begun to be formed and the people--seamen as well as officers--had barely become acquainted, and so to say, there was taking place a polishing of characters and habits and the strengthening of such qualities as are needed for the successful accomplishment of missions on difficult sea cruises.

Now, when much time has passed since those days, I firmly know: if you want the collective to be a single, harmonious, combat-effective family you should begin with rallying the officers, with the creation of an atmosphere of amicability, confidentiality, frankness, mutual respect, and mutual demandingness among the officers. Unfortunately, at that time, at the very beginning we had little of this. Here is an example. Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant M. Verpakhovskiy and Engineer-Lieutenant A. Yegorov, as they say, did not get along. The young officer committed an error, and the more experienced one was not able to behave tolerantly and tactfully and help the person find his place in the collective. And it is a well-known thing that under such conditions the indoctrination of subordinates also suffers. But the collective was molded all the same.

We also accomplished this task--the rallying of the collective--with the entire collective, making full use of the capabilities and authority of the ship's party and Komsomol organizations. We tried to see that each officer, warrant officer, and petty officer not only knew the principles of pedagogy and psychology, but also was able to employ his knowledge in a specific situation. It would appear that we didn't even overlook insignificant deviations from the requirements of the regulation--whether on the part of the officer, warrant officer, or seaman, and much attention was devoted to setting up the organization of service on the ship. All this and much more provided their results.

Today, I again look at these people: its as if they had not changed but, nevertheless, they have become quite different. Here is Engineer-Lieutenant A. Yegorov. He received permission to handle a group and mastered the duties of watch engineering officer. The young officer has already accumulated experience in working with people and become an intelligent organizer of the training process and socialist competition in the subunit. Why, this is a

great success. And rightfully sharing it with Yegorov is Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant M. Verpakhovskiy, thanks to whose interested and benevolent attitude the young officer became as we know him now.

Here is Petty Officer 1st Class V. Dedushchenko. Yes, yes, petty officer, I did not make a slip in speaking. Dedushchenko was restored to his former duty and rank. It is difficult to say when this person began to change. Perhaps, after a long talk with him by the commander--officer Verpakhovskiy? Or after Dedushchenko apologized to Seaman Boyko? Or.... By the way, the turning point probably began because work with this person was conducted constantly and pointedly.

I cannot fail to tell about one more thing which tells graphically of the status of work in rallying a military collective: the subunit commanded by Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant M. Verpakhovskiy is now excellent and the best in the force.

Yes, the people whom we bring up change noticeably. But you see, this process is, so to say, two-sided: we also change. Officer Verpakhovskiy now began to work with each person, got to know his subordinates closely, and managed to present himself in such a way that people come to him for advice and assistance at a difficult moment. And really, how can one not go to a person who, by his own example, shows up as an example in the accomplishment of military duty and his obligations. I recall that on one of the long cruises when a malfunction occurred and it was even difficult to think that it could be eliminated under gale conditions, M. Verpakhovskiy carried people along behind him on this difficult matter. He did not leave the hold until everything had been put in order. The seamen then were sincerely delighted by the endurance, coolness, knowledge, and persistence of their commander. And once again, it is not surprising: another time Engineer-Lieutenant A. Yegorov showed up in the same way under difficult conditions.

I cannot fail to mention a tradition which has already been formed on the ship--to have a tactful, attentive, and concerned attitude toward one another and to be mutually demanding and exacting. And this, in my view, is extremely important. I thought a great deal about the reasons by which nonmilitary relations between seamen arise once in a while. It seems that I know one of them completely accurately: it is the crudeness and tactlessness of seniors. Look here: an officer treated a warrant officer coarsely in a fit of temper. The latter offended a petty officer, and the petty officer--a seaman. The echo of ill breeding does not roll on with decreasing force but, on the contrary, with increasing force.

At the time of our collective's establishment, we conducted a decisive struggle against crudeness and we made the officers responsible first of all for its manifestation just as strictly as for omissions in combat training and socialist competition, of course. Of course, we are not ceasing this work even now: the lesson which the entire crew received was not lost on it.

The last long cruise was a test for the crew, not only of its combat maturity, but also of solidarity and psychological steadfastness. No one made a mistake. The people were united by the unity of the goal: to accomplish all missions successfully. The goal was attained. I think that we are also coping with the other missions. Because today we are one harmonious combat family which lives according to a lofty principle: one for all and all for one.

6367

CSO: 1801

GUARD SERVICE: IMPORTANCE STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Col A. Khorev and Lt Col V. Filatov: "Notes by a Military Writer: The Sentry is an Inviolable Person"]

[Excerpts] There are moments in a soldier's life which mean especially much for the shaping of a fighting man's character and for instilling the high moral-combat qualities needed by a person called upon to defend the honor, freedom and independence of the Motherland with weapon in hand. Performance of guard service is one such moment. The USSR Armed Forces Garrison and Guard Services Regulation approved by Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet equates guard service juridically to the performance of a combat mission.

The Regulation prohibits the assignment to guard duty of service personnel who have not taken the military oath, who have not mastered the young soldier's training program, or who are sick... This is logical and natural. Performance of a combat mission is assigned only to those who are capable and ready for combat and who see themselves as citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics who have joined the ranks of the Armed Forces and who have solemnly sworn to defend the Motherland courageously, capably, and with dignity and honor, without sparing their blood or life itself.

Defense of the Motherland is a vast concept full of meaning. For the sentry to perform the combat mission of guarding and defending an assigned object is the protection of the socialist homeland and of its state interests and security. This is why the exploits of sentries are honored just as highly and sacredly as those of the frontlinesmen. That is why the imperious word--Sentry--has a proud ring and radiates a romantic aura. And probably every person who has been appointed to guard duty at least once in his life also remembers, on hearing this word, the popular regulation formula: A sentry is an inviolable person.

For this formula contains all the special, specific features of a sentry's legal status. His inviolability, rights, personal dignity and unhindered performance of his duties are secured by law. He is subordinate only to

strictly defined persons--the guard commander, his assistant, and the corporal of the guard. Everyone except for persons to whom the sentry is subordinate are obligated to follow implicitly his demands as defined by the service for guarding the assigned post. A sentry must guard his post vigilantly. Even when there is the threat of death, he does not have the right to abandon it until he is relieved or removed under procedures established by the Regulation. The right given a sentry to employ arms in instances spelled out in the Regulation is of special importance.

These are the specifics. They are what define and give rise to the special meaning of guard service for shaping the soldier. As we know, people are not born soldiers, they develop into them. They do not, of course, develop all at once, overnight. They mature, come to manhood, and develop day by day, month by month. And just as people become convinced of an ability to swim only by being in the water, so they establish themselves in the calling of soldier by testing themselves in the performance of guard service, by being in the position of a sentry, and becoming convinced that their difficult obligations are within their ability, the extraordinary rights are reasonable, and the high responsibility is within their power. People do not undergo such a test in an impromptu manner. The personnel have to be prepared very carefully for it. In the units where this is well understood and capably done, it is not only the guard service which goes smoothly. The entire process of political and military indoctrination is better there. The role of our Armed Forces as a remarkable school of labor and military schooling, moral purity and courage, patriotism and comradeship is accomplished more fully there.

For example, that is just how matters are arranged in a majority of units of the Belorussian Military District. Guard training is carried out here in strict conformity with requirements of the Regulation. Commanders personally handle the selection of guard personnel. Classes are held in a practical manner, with consideration of the peculiarities of guarding each object, at areas specially outfitted for this purpose. Political entities and the party and Komsomol organizations see that party and Komsomol members set a personal example in the performance of guard service. They do a great deal to popularize those who distinguish themselves, and they generalize and propagandize the experience of the best commanders and staffs. The entire atmosphere of guard training and the ritual of posting and relieving the guard--everything attunes the soldier for a responsible attitude toward service and for performing it vigilantly and precisely. Soldiers perceive assignment to the guard as a great honor and trust. They affirm their right to this by faultless conduct, by an irreproachable knowledge of the provisions of regulations, by capable mastery of weapons, and by coolness and self-control in difficult situations.

Regulations are written by those who themselves have experienced all the burdens of service and who have understood from their own experience all its fine points and all its secrets. There is no subtext in the Regulation's articles. It cannot be interpreted this way and that way--only as it is

written! There is no gap here between word and spirit. There are no recommendations here which may or may not be carried out. Here there is only the law.

A display of excessive credulity even in everyday life is not a praiseworthy quality. The credulity of a person at a post is a crime.

There are different kinds of malefactors and each one who heads for an object guarded by a sentry has his own goal and his own tactics. The sentry can counter these different malefactors only in one way--by acting strictly by the Regulation and as the Regulation commands: competently, decisively and fearlessly.

We have spoken with soldiers who have occasion to perform guard service regularly. When the talk turned to what might be of special interest for a malefactor attempting to penetrate a post, they mentioned aircraft, if they themselves had guarded an aircraft hardstand; they mentioned tanks if they had guarded tanks; and they mentioned missiles if they had guarded them. But only one out of ten mentioned, for example, the submachinegun--the weapon with which the sentry stood his post.

Yes, malefactors vary. Some sneak up to a military installation because they have a spy mission. Others penetrate the same installation with a completely different purpose: They don't need a tank, a gun or a military secret. They need the weapon of the sentry himself--the submachinegun. Because they simply are highway bandits and need the submachinegun for robbing.

In order to get a sentry's weapon, a malefactor has to close with the sentry without fail and come into contact with him without fail, if only for a very brief time. And here the criminal's chief trump is his reliance on the sentry's credulity, on his negligence, and on a dulling of his vigilance.

It has happened at all times where sentries have perished because of their negligence, because of incompetent, indecisive actions during an attack on the post, and because of confusion and an inability to use the weapon correctly and opportunely. There have been instances where they also perished because of cowardice. The sentries themselves are at fault here, of course. One must prepare for performing a combat mission just as if it were a combat mission--without any allowances or conditionalities. The fact is we really are speaking about life and death, and not about a stroll arm in arm with the submachinegun. But much blame for all deficiencies in the performance of guard service lies with commanders and staffs who are responsible for training the guards.

Some of them unfortunately relax attention to matters of organizing guard service. They do not always view it as performance of a combat mission and do not present the proper exactingness toward preparing guard personnel. The "small" sentry with a submachinegun at times seems to be lost among the

hulking missiles and nuclear-powered vessels, among the supersonic and all-weather fighter-interceptors, and among various intelligent complexes and automated systems. Some soldiers are trained to master electronics, automatics and telemechanics. They are on speaking terms with electronic computers. But they do not know, nor are they capable of this age-old soldier job of knowing how to act practically during an attack on a sentry or on the installation he is guarding.

Formalism is intolerable in any matter. It is mortally intolerable in the matter of organizing guard service and in preparing sentries for performing a combat mission.

6904

CSO: 1801

CRITICISM: REPORT AND ACTION DISCREPANCIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Sep 79 p 4

[Satirical article by Lt Col Justice I. Vashkevich: "Behind the Cloak of Reports"]

[Text] Thoughts and decisions, pledges and plans--what good ones we have! And we would so much like to see all of them implemented and embodied, fulfilled and overfulfilled as quickly as possible. What wouldn't one do to bring nearer the day when one can report through channels about a remarkable achievement of one's entrusted collective. And it seems that the congratulations and applause already can be heard...

Then you open your eyes and on the desk is a complaint about deficiencies in a subordinate establishment, subunit or institution... Some petitioner whom no one knows is spoiling such a dream and such a song!

Not long ago a letter came to the editors from a training support subunit of the Chelyabinsk Higher Military Navigators School about serious shortcomings in the organization of messing for subunit personnel. The editors sent it to the staff of aviation of the Ural Military District. Then came the answer: The shortcomings had been eliminated, the cooks replaced, guilty parties admonished. The petitioner's pun... Oh, reader, you so long for an evil rhyme! But usually prose is written in official answers. "A discussion was held with the personnel who addressed the newspaper," Lt Gen Avn V. Gorbachev informed the editors.

The word for which the rhyme was lacking was pronounced by those with whom the "confidential discussion" was held. In their next letter to the editors privates first class Yefimov and Tkach stated that it reduced to telling the people "not to write any more such letters." "But we believe," continued the authors of the letter, "that there are no limitations in our regulations, nor can there be, for military personnel to turn to their newspaper, and references, for example, to certain provisions of the Code of Disciplinary Punishment are inappropriate here."

But I believe it would be hasty to rebuke the author of the response to the editors for not clarifying with members of the commission for checking the complaint, headed by Col S. Yermakov, the nature of their discussion with the petitioners. Subordinates have to be trusted. But the district aviation staff probably could have taken a more exacting attitude toward the commission's work. Otherwise it might happen that shortcomings which have been eliminated for the present will reappear tomorrow, were one to look.

In short, one must trust, but also check, for without proper supervision over the execution of decisions which are made, heaven only knows what revisions might be made. For example, to a situation such as occurred in Garrison "X" of the Moscow Air Defense District, where sick people had to walk several kilometers, and all through the forest, to obtain a sick slip.

...The circumstances because of which the medical station of Unit "X" would not be able to receive members of servicemen's families soon became known to the appropriate commanders, the political entity and military medical personnel in good time. The responsible comrades should have assembled and decided what to do, but there was no time for assembling. And from the moment the doors of the unit medical station closed to the wives and children of officers and warrant officers, complaints went to various echelons.

The echelons intervened. They could not expand the existing medical station, and so the question of organizing, as an exception, an emergency medical aid station of the local health department at the remote garrison was raised at the next session of the local soviet of people's deputies. There was essentially no discussion on this matter at the session: The people's elected representatives unanimously decreed that there be such a station with the right of issuing sick slips for up to three days. It would appear that the officials now had to make up for lost time and implement the soviet's decision as quickly as possible. But this did not happen. And five months after the March session, the members of servicemen's families still were walking from the military post over familiar paths for the sick slips.

On the other hand, there was no lack of triumphant reports. In response to the editors' query, Lt Col A. Kokosha heartily reported the opening of the medical station, and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA informed the readers about this. Maj Med Serv A. Volkov informed his superiors about the same. Col Med Serv L. Dernin, acting chief of the military medical department of Moscow Air Defense District, was absolutely sure that the matter really had been corrected right up until the phone call from the editors, when it became known that the triumphant reports had outstripped the course of affairs considerably. After promising to recheck the fulfillment of his instructions, Leonid Afanas'yevich meanwhile deemed it necessary to remark that the servicemen's wives from the remote garrison in general were complaining... in vain (!)

"There is a most excellent hospital there," said Leonid Afanas'yevich. "A bus runs eight times. And it is only 4½ km from the military post! I measured it myself from the speedometer..."

Well, what could be said? That eight buses is one every two or three hours? That 4½ km on the speedometer is not equivalent to the same distance measured from the pedometer? And with a sick child in one's arms at that. Aren't the sources of the unprecedented red tape with the opening of a medical station at the post in such indifference of some comrades to the needs of people? Doesn't such indifference of the officials to the end results of their work reflect a similar approach to that very job which they are called upon to perform?

For it is only one step to direct eyewash from the desire to see everything in rosy colors, to avoid sharp corners and not to consider the actual state of affairs.

The present year was marked by a serious lag in implementing planning quotas for many tailor shops of the Moscow Garrison. Signals are coming to the editors about an excessive delay in deadlines for filling orders for making uniform jackets, trousers and overcoats. Clothing for one officer was being made in one shop from December 1977 through June of this year! What can be said here about coping with the plan?! But if one looks at the accounting documents, the picture is not so depressing. Everything normal! Everything in accordance "with the plan"! Everyone is getting bonuses! The slogan of the All-Army Competition in Military Trade, "Work without Laggards!" is being implemented successfully!

The explanation is quite simple. There are people in the capital garrison who are working. For example, the collective of the Moscow Experimental Military Uniform Store is fulfilling and overfulfilling the quotas. As a rule, they sew uniforms quickly here and turn them over to the customers at the first request. Honor and praise to such people! Praise and... regular increments to the plan established at the beginning of the Five-Year Plan, the year and the quarter. This year alone the quota for the local masters was adjusted upward twice (apparently as an experiment): in February and in May, for an overall sum of 14,000 rubles. It is as if to say let them work under the fear of losing the bonus, and on the other hand, others will get bonuses without any difficulty...

We really have remarkable plans, and many of our pledges and decisions really contribute to successful realization of what has been planned. To this end there must be painstaking, purposeful, effective work by each person. There must be a knowledge of the true state of affairs, including on the basis of a study of letters, petitions and complaints of the workers. There must be a check and supervision over the execution of decisions which have been made, and fervent interest in seeing that work goes well not only in the accounting documents, but in practice as well.

SHORTCOMINGS: MOTOR VEHICLE MAINTENANCE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sep 79 p 2

[Letter to editors by WO I. Yaunzem: "Out of Repair... Into Repair"]

[Text] I had to drive several hundred kilometers to the automotive repair enterprise headed by Engr-Col N. Samonin. I drove in a hurry, for the message sent from the enterprise to our unit commander stated that repairs had been completed on one of our vehicles and it was necessary to receive it urgently. But it turned out I hurried in vain. Forty-five defects were revealed in an inspection of the vehicle! But it was supposed to be driven to the unit under its own power. I had to demand that the heads of the enterprise perform additional repairs on the vehicle, but to no avail. It was necessary to complain to the higher echelon. On learning about this, the repair personnel began to fix the deficiencies.

Perhaps this unpleasant episode is a random occurrence? I would be happy to think this, but I cannot. The fact is that such a thing also occurred last year and the year before last, when I traveled several times to pick up vehicles turned in for repair. The vehicles "repaired" at the enterprise had up to 80 defects.

Just when will such a faulty practice of how an enterprise treats its customers finally end?

6904
CSO: 1801

COMMAND TRAINING: NEED FOR INITIATIVE DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Col A. Shcherbakov: "A Commander's Development: Execution and Initiative"]

[Text] Lt V. Maksimov was appointed senior officer of a column of vehicles proceeding to an exercise area with fuel. Subunit commander Capt K. Volkov briefed him and pointed out the movement route on the map.

"There have been heavy, torrential rains in recent days," he reminded Maksimov. "Some sectors of the road may become impassable. So act as the circumstances require."

The column did not arrive at the area by the designated time. It had become stuck in a low area on a soggy forest road. At the same time, vehicles from other subunits bypassed the low area to one side and covered the entire route without complications.

Lt Maksimov did not make excuses. He simply did not see that he was to blame for what happened:

"I followed the order exactly--I took the column along the route indicated by the subunit commander."

But the subunit commander intended that, in case of any complications, the lieutenant would make a decision with consideration of the specific conditions.

On beginning the descent into the low area, Maksimov could not help but see that fresh automobile tracks went off from it to the left. That meant there was a detour here. And the driver believed that he should turn to the left, but the lieutenant did not dare take that step:

"It's not our job to complicate matters. We'll take the road given us."

In my opinion, this incident is a rather convincing illustration that the practical value of execution which is not reinforced by independence or initiative is degraded substantially. The habit of acting in expectation of prompting may lead to nonfulfillment of an assigned mission.

The role of creative initiative in an officer's official work is growing constantly. Let's take an ordinary class, practice session or practice battle. In their course it is impossible to foresee all situations ahead of time and provide unambiguous recommendations on how to act in a particular instance. Figuratively speaking, existing instructions and manuals determine strategy, but tactics is wholly in the hands of the performers. They are required to have speed of thinking and action, decisiveness, independence and initiative.

Experienced commanders proceed from this assumption in planning the introduction of young officers into formation and in giving them assistance in development as commanders. For example, the creative style of work in Unit "X" can be said without exaggeration to be inherent in a majority of officers, including young ones. Flexibility of thinking, speed of action, an ability to avoid stereotyped decisions made according to an established scheme, and the ability to outfox the "enemy" and seize the initiative are qualities developed in the officers in classes, practice sessions and exercises. Here they strive to achieve the important element: for a specialist to ponder the problem at hand on his own and definitely try to find a solution to a difficult situation. This is why lieutenants A. Burma, A. Novikov, V. Malykhin and others are growing rapidly in the professional sense. They act decisively and with initiative in problems and exercises and achieve success.

The contemporary level of technical outfitting allows a substantial increase in the quality of the training process. Nevertheless, it sometimes happens that specialists show certain results in the training room, but show other, lower results during combat work. The unit where Officer P. Roslyakov heads the training methods council conducted research into why this happens. Staff officers, subunit commanders, leading specialists and young officers took part in this work. Some had doubts: "But what can yesterday's school graduates propose?"

But that was just how the problem was posed: to take a broad look at the problem, from different points of view. And it was not only the suggestions of the experienced methodologists which proved useful, but those of the young officers as well. The study showed that some specialists become confused during combat work. It became clear that insufficient attention is given to shaping volitional qualities in them.

Taking account of the proposals and recommendations made, the unit proceeded to improve training methods, to make practice sessions more complex and to make broad use of simulation gear. A positive result was achieved.

Special emphasis should be placed on the role of a commander's tact in instilling initiative in subordinates, for it happens that an officer has decided to display initiative, but nothing comes of it. If the commander does not control himself and gives his subordinate a good scolding: "Who needs your independent action?", one can be almost certain that the next time the officer will prefer to act cautiously and await prompting.

Independence and initiative. When we do not discover them in an officer's character, our favorable impression of him fades. Of two candidates for advancement, we will not choose him--efficient but without initiative--but the other, the one who is not afraid to assume responsibility and act imaginatively. From a purely humane point of view, though, it is a pity about the first candidate. His immediate superiors should have directed attention earlier to shortcomings in his character and in his work style and helped him get rid of them. But this did not happen and so it is their immediate fault in addition to his own.

Sometimes a young officer who has not received support in carrying out some kind of undertaking acts at his own risk, as they say. That is what happened with Lt I. Lyashenko. He gave the subunit commander a suggestion on improving training methodology. Hardly having listened to what was being said, the commander said with disappointment:

"We have enough of other problems... But if you would like, use your own methodology."

Lt Lyashenko of course sensed that the commander simply had waved him off. Nevertheless, he did not give up his idea. Two weeks later he brought the commander a thick notebook with an inscription on the cover: "Experimental Methodology for Accelerated Specialist Training." The commander kept it and promised to look into it. And as a matter of fact, he opened the notebook several times in an attempt to delve into the essence of the suggestions, but urgent affairs kept interfering. And so he returned the notebook to the lieutenant and said vaguely:

"Work a bit more on your methodology, give it good thought and we will discuss it later..."

The lieutenant was offended and decided to test the new methodology on his own. He wrote one thing in the lesson plans, but conducted the classes in his own way. It stands to reason that not everything went well for him.

When the staff officers studied the young officer's proposals in a most careful manner, they found a rational element in them. They also pointed out Lt. Lyashenko's methods mistakes. The methodology was improved. Subsequently the time for specialist training managed to be reduced. Sensing the trust, Sr Lt Lyashenko (he recently was advanced in rank and position) is seeking new ways for increasing the intensification of classes.

It would appear to be clear that to trust someone is one thing, but to leave subordinates on their own is quite a different matter. Nevertheless, not every commander chooses the correct line in his practical work.

Officer S. Nikitin has commanded a subunit for more than just one year. He cannot be reproached for lacking experience in working with people. In recent months the collective invariably has been among the leaders in competition. The commander naturally was praised as well. And it was here that he became self-complacent without noticing it.

When young officers arrived in the subunit he chatted with them and immediately concluded that they were trained personnel and things would go well for them. Alas, they encountered great difficulties, for even the plan for introducing young officers into formation had been drawn up hastily and existed only on paper. Signs of their lag in training for taking the test for authorization for independent work already had begun to appear, but Nikitin kept saying:

"We don't have to clip their wings or coddle them."

The words essentially are correct. It is unfortunate only that Officer Nikitin was not able to back them up with deeds. Lack of supervision and absence of assistance on the commander's part led to the dates for command development of some young officers being extended. Intervention of the senior commander was required in order to eliminate the deficiencies and assist Officer Nikitin in rearranging his work style.

Imagination, initiative and independence are not innate qualities. Continuously instilling them in officers means struggling for a further strengthening of discipline and an increase in vigilance and combat readiness of subunits and units.

6904

CSO: 1801

COMBAT TRADITIONS: IMPORTANCE STRESSED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Arty Ye. Stroganov, chief of staff of rocket troops and artillery of the Ground Forces: "School of Life, School of Indoctrination: Concreteness in the Propaganda of Traditions"]

[Text] I recently had occasion to participate in a discussion about traditions in one of the artillery regiments. The officers spoke well about the grand traditions of our Armed Forces and the need for augmenting them in units and subunits. I also supported them with all my heart. The remarkable traditions which have taken shape in the Armed Forces also are inherent to every military collective individually. But at the same time, every unit and every subunit also must have its own traditions.

For example, I only had to ask those present about the traditions giving the regiment a special, unique appearance, and a pause arose immediately and the discussion began to lose concreteness. Some doubted whether or not the question could be posed in such a plane: Traditions allegedly are general and common to all.

Yes, there are such traditions, and they represent a powerful force. The heroic past of the people and the experience of older generations who fought the enemy and built a socialist society were embodied in the grand revolutionary, combat and labor traditions. V. I. Lenin saw in revolutionary traditions a powerful factor in indoctrinating the people.

More than one generation of Soviet military personnel has been indoctrinated on the remarkable traditions which took shape in the Army and Navy. We are obligated to augment them by the CPSU Central Committee Decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work."

Commanders and political officers in the regiment in question do a great deal to propagandize traditions. There are impressive displays dedicated to the heroic history of the Armed Forces in the unit room of combat glory and in the reading rooms of subunits. Traditions are mentioned in political classes, lectures and discussions. Nevertheless, one cannot help but notice

a weak link in this work: Concreteness is lacking in propaganda of the traditions of the unit itself. Commanders reduce everything to telling about the regiment's combat history. But the fact is that some features inherent only to this unit formed and were reinforced on the front roads and in the fields of peacetime training. If they are not mentioned or propagandized, then how can we fulfill the requirement of Article 53 of the USSR Armed Forces Internal Service Regulation in this case, which stresses: "Maintaining and augmenting unit (ship) traditions and passing on foremost experience represent very important obligations of all commanders (chiefs)"?

All the traditions of our Army were inherent in the 40th Artillery Regiment, 4th Bezhitsa Rifle Division, in which I had occasion to fight. But there also were our own regimental traditions. Among them, for example, was the following: to help young soldiers master combat specialties in the shortest possible time. It stands to reason that other units also worked painstakingly with the young replacements. In this instance we are not speaking simply about attention or readiness to assist and support a new recruit. In our 40th Artillery Regiment this was a deeply perceived inner need for each soldier and comprised an object of special pride. We knew that any of our compatriots enjoyed the reputation of a thoroughly trained artilleryman in other regiments as well, and we cherished this a great deal. The tradition which formed grew stronger thanks to the support of commanders and political officers and turned into a force which exerted a constant influence on personnel.

The 80th Separate Antitank Battalion of our division had its own tradition: to hit enemy armored targets with the first round. I am not speaking about a slogan or a wish, but specifically of a tradition. An enormous amount of work was necessary to bring the expertise of gunners and the cohesiveness of gun teams to perfection. And not only bring it to perfection, but maintain it at this level. The fact is that after every battle the teams had to receive replacements. And it was not just the commanders, but all soldiers who instilled in the new recruits the immutable principles of the battalion's life: A round fired meant a target.

Traditions also form in peacetime in any unit which are characteristic only of that unit. They naturally do not form of themselves. As is correctly stated in the Regulation, they must be maintained.

I am very familiar with a battery which for eight years now has affirmed the title of outstanding from year to year. It has been commanded by Maj I. Sandovenko for the last five years. Doesn't stability and invariable success really provide cause to speak of a tradition which has been formed? I believe that a tradition is apparent. To propagandize the supreme achievements in training as a tradition means to touch people to the quick and inspire them to achieve new goals. Neither the commander nor a private can allow the subunit to lose the positions it has won during his period of service. This is already a question of honor.

The very same can be said about many other subunits. For example, the battery commanded by Capt N. Velichko has distinguished itself for four years in a row by exemplary internal order. For several years the company commanded by Capt K. Irenev has received the highest grade for equipment upkeep. And indoctrination work in these subunits would lose a great deal were the commanders to forget to emphasize the succession of achievements or the link between the past and present or were they not to cherish a tradition which is taking shape as an important achievement of the collective.

In short, every subunit and every unit must have its own traditions inherent only to it. They supplement traditions common to the Armed Forces just as, for example, the traditions of some one family supplement the traditions which are nationwide.

One can only regret that propaganda of a unit's own traditions clearly lacks concreteness in some units. If a collective has achieved some kind of success, it is spoken of as a separate, special achievement. But the interests of indoctrination also require an analysis of preceding events and of the organic link between past results and what was achieved. I stress once again that traditions form over a lengthy period of time. It is difficult for them to gain a foothold and firmly capture the awareness and hearts of soldiers without the support of commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol organizations. Traditions require official recognition and reinforcement, if one can express it in this manner.

It often happens that a unit or subunit speaks a great deal about success in a final check while forgetting to emphasize the link between what was achieved and the work of people who already have completed service. For example, a company showed itself to be outstanding in an inspection parade. That also was the case a year ago. This indicates a tradition. Who if not the commander should direct everyone's attention to this fact and spark the subordinates' desire to reinforce what was achieved and to achieve more? And let there appear a line about the company tradition of being first in formation as well in the reading room and on the display propagandizing the traditions of the Armed Forces.

Propaganda of traditions is a very important sector of ideological and political indoctrination work. The effectiveness of this work depends largely on the ability of commanders, political officers and the party and Komsomol organizations to propagandize and augment concrete traditions of the native unit and native subunit which can be perceived by every serviceman.

6904

CSO: 1801

ARMED FORCES: SOCIAL ROLE DISCUSSED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 79 pp 2-3

[Article by Col K. Vorob'yev, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "Theory, Politics, Ideology: The Armed Forces and Social Progress"]

[Text] Problems of social progress and the question of mankind's future are troubling people's minds to an ever greater extent. This future is linked both with the direction in social-economic development chosen by each country, and with the outcome of the opposition of two opposite social systems, and with the question of war and peace.

The Armed Forces as a specific state entity always have occupied an important place in social life, and do so now. Being a tool of the politics of dominant classes, they have exerted and are exerting a profound influence on the course of social development. And the fact is completely obvious that the social-historical direction of this influence depends on whose hands control the armed forces and the will of which class they are carrying out.

Bourgeois ideologists attempt in every possible way to conceal this truth from the people. They consciously confuse the question of the armed forces' role in social development and pass them off as some kind of "nonclass" institution. Contemporary propagandists of imperialism, and theorists of a reformist and right-revisionist leaning along with them, attempt to prove what cannot be proved and depict the armed forces of a capitalist state as politically neutral and a kind of tool for preserving "harmony between different social forces."

The falsity of such kind of assertions was revealed long ago with all thoroughness by V. I. Lenin. In the article "The Army and the Revolution," he wrote: "The armed forces cannot and must not be neutral. Don't drag the army into politics is the slogan of hypocritical servants of the bourgeoisie . . . who in fact always have drawn the armed forces into reactionary politics..." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy [Complete Collected Works], XII, 113). At all times the armed forces have been the primary tool of the military coercion and politics of the ruling classes.

The problem of armed violence is also not viewed abstractly in Marxist-Leninist theory, but concretely and historically, from a position of progressive social forces, from the standpoint of the interests of the working class. Such violence is justified only when it overcomes the resistance of reactionary forces and contributes to a progressive development of society. In so doing, the armed violence of revolutionary masses bears a forced character and is wholly caused by military resistance of the obsolescent social forces opposing them.

Objective conditions play a determining role in social progress. First of all, they give rise to the very need for resolving particular problems of social development and, secondly, they create real opportunities for this. It has long ago been proven that if there are no objective conditions for a revolutionary overthrow and a revolutionary situation is absent, then no efforts of the class or party will lead to social transformations.

But when objective conditions have matured, then the subjective factor acquires decisive importance: the capability of the revolutionary class to undertake decisive actions; the party's capability to direct these actions and lead the masses; the presence of a military organization and its ability to break the armed resistance of forces being overthrown and to defend the revolution. V. I. Lenin said that "violence can be employed without having economic roots, but then it is doomed by history. But it is possible to employ violence relying on a leading class and on higher principles of the socialist system, order and organization. And then it can temporarily suffer failure, but it is invincible" (XXXVIII, 369-370).

Marxist-Leninist propositions on the correlation of objective and subjective factors and on the essence of armed violence permit a proper understanding of the role of the military organization in society's social development and in the contemporary world revolutionary process.

The question of the influence of the armed forces on the life of society bears two aspects in a class-antagonistic society, including a bourgeois society: an internal and an external aspect. The former is connected with the use of the armed forces to defend the interests of the exploiters against "their own" people and with protection of the existing order. The latter aspect is the predatory activity of such armies and their gendarme function in the international arena.

Ideologists of the monopolistic bourgeoisie strive in every possible way to conceal both these functions of their armies. They love to speak of "a person's freedom and equality" in the world of capital and his constitutional rights. But everyone knows the price of these rights. They are thoroughly trampled and remain formal, on paper alone. And today the conclusion drawn by V. I. Lenin with regard to the world of capital is just as current: "There is not one state, even the most democratic, where there are no loopholes or stipulations in constitutions providing the bourgeoisie with an opportunity to move troops against the workers, to declare martial law and so on" (XXXVII, 253).

Take the U.S. Army, for example. It is used within the country along with other punitive entities to suppress demonstrations by American workers and students, especially blacks. Troops are in constant readiness to employ weapons against the people. The following figures are known. In the 25 years since World War II, the American Army has taken part in putting down demonstrations by workers within its country over 700 times, i.e., around 30 times a year. The armies of other imperialist states also perform such a role within their countries.

Ruling circles of imperialism give the armed forces a very important role in preserving their state and strengthen this bulwark of their authority in every possible way. Revolutionary-democratic forces in countries of capital set the task of drawing the armed forces to their side in the struggle for social progress. And where this succeeds, success of the liberation movement is assured (Portugal). The further course of revolution naturally also depends on other factors. But where the struggle for the armed forces is insufficient, they are used by reactionary forces for their own purposes, as was the case in the counterrevolutionary overthrow in Chile.

The opposition of imperialist armies to social progress in the international arena is varied.

First of all, these armies are the chief tool of wars and aggression of imperialism. In the modern era they are targeted against countries of socialism, and the Soviet Union above all.

Secondly, imperialism carries out the policy of "containment" and "repelling" of the entire world revolutionary process, especially the national liberation movement, with the help of armies. For example, after World War II the United States sent its troops and other punitive forces abroad for putting down national liberation movements on an average of every 1½ years. In the 200 years of its existence, the U.S. Marine Corps has participated in more than 300 military campaigns and police operations in various countries. A special "quick reaction corps" numbering 110,000 officers and men now is being set up in the United States to perform gendarme functions.

Thirdly, the chief imperialist powers provide an enormous amount of military assistance to reactionary political regimes in a large number of countries where they are threatened by the revolutionary movement of popular masses. For example, during the period from 1973 through 1977 the United States granted \$4.3 billion gratis and as credits to ten repressive governments, including Chile, Thailand, Korea and Uruguay and sold them over \$17.5 billion in weapons. Around 13,000 officers now serving reactionary governments have been trained in U.S. military educational institutions.

Fourthly, the monopolistic bourgeoisie is integrating military efforts on an international scale and creating military-political blocs for its own selfish interests in conformity with its expansionistic, aggressive policy, trampling on the interests of the broadest popular masses.

Reality thus confirms the correctness of the conclusion drawn by the 25th CPSU Congress: If a real threat arises to the domination of monopoly capital and its political henchmen, imperialism will go to all lengths, casting aside all appearances of any kind of democracy. It is ready to trample on the sovereignty of states and any legality, not to mention humaneness. And imperialism places chief reliance in conducting its expansionistic, aggressive, predatory politics on the armed forces, which thus act as the tool of regression and a brake to the progressive development of society.

The armies of young liberated states now play a specific role in social progress. Within their countries they are an important political force exerting profound influence on social processes and on the development and replacement of forms of state authority. The role of armies in the political life of the nations of young national states is growing in our time. By virtue of their high organization and discipline and possessing the right to have weapons, the armed forces can exert a decisive influence under specific conditions on the course of the country's social development and change its direction. But in each specific instance the question of what kind of change this will be--progressive or reactionary, contributing to social progress or retarding it--depends on what forces are managing the armed forces and providing them with a program of action.

Practice shows that the role of the armed forces in a national liberation movement and in the development of young states is far from identical. In those countries oriented on capitalism, armies act as a support to reactionary-bureaucratic regimes in their struggle against revolutionary-democratic forces. Noncapitalistic development was interrupted in some countries in recent years (Egypt) or a withdrawal from a progressive course was observed (Somalia). The armed forces here were transformed into a tool of the reactionary ruling circles.

Armies in countries with a socialist orientation are an anti-imperialistic, antifeudal force and stand up in defense of national independence and the revolutionary-democratic achievements of the people. For example, the armed forces of Angola and Ethiopia defended the right of their people to build socialism in a fierce struggle.

Progressive tendencies of the development of society are reflected in armies of countries with a socialist orientation. The officer corps is filled with workers' representatives. For example, the Syrian Army now has almost 80 percent of officers who are former peasants, workers, artisans and minor employees. National-democratic governments devote much attention to ideological indoctrination work in the armed forces. Service personnel take an active part in accomplishing various social-economic tasks. For example, the Algerian Army plays an important role in carrying out the "agrarian revolution," and armies of Angola, Mozambique and other countries play a large part in eliminating illiteracy among the populace and educating the workers.

Consequently, armies of countries with a socialist orientation act as an active, social force in the struggle for social progress. But it must be borne in mind that even with its most progressive activities, an army cannot replace the revolutionary activities of the proletariat and its party. Only the working class headed by the Marxist-Leninist party is capable of taking socialist transformations to their conclusion.

Armies of socialist states play a qualitatively new role in social progress. This role is determined by their social nature and by the historical purpose as an armed force of the working class and toiling masses.

The army of a workers' and peasants' state serves socialism, which personifies the supreme level of social progress in the modern era. The army serves the working class, which has the historic mission of freeing labor of capital and creating a society of the social equality of people. Service to the cause of the working class and all toilers objectively makes the socialist army a progressive force in social development. The entire history of the Soviet Armed Forces serves as an example of this.

From the very beginning, our Army was created as an Army of the workers, as a tool for protecting their interests in the struggle against exploiters. All wars which the Soviet people and their Armed Forces were forced to wage were just. We bared our sword only against those who encroached on the land of Soviets and on its freedom and independence.

During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war, our Army defended the revolutionary achievements of the Soviet people and their right to build socialism against domestic and foreign enemies. In this way the USSR Armed Forces also fulfilled their international duty. They defended the socialist homeland--the beacon and bulwark of workers around the world, the base of the world revolutionary process.

Such was the social-political essence and meaning of our armed struggle against fascist Germany--the chief shock force of international imperialism. Victory in the Great Patriotic War was a triumph of the Soviet social and state system and of the forces of progress over forces of reaction. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev writes in his memoirs entitled "Malaya Zemlya": "Our victory is a milestone in the history of mankind."

Mankind's social progress was further accelerated under the effect of the Soviet Union's victory over fascist Germany and militaristic Japan. There was a sharp weakening and narrowing of the sphere of capitalism and a deepening of the general crisis of capitalism. The forces of socialism and democracy developed and grew strong. Socialist revolutions were victorious in a number of countries of Europe and Asia.

The victorious procession of socialism after World War II provided a powerful impetus to development of the national liberation movement in colonial and dependent countries. The colonial system of imperialism crumbled under

its blows. Favorable conditions also arose for the development of the world communist and workers' movement.

The USSR Armed Forces made and are making a tangible contribution to the cause of social progress in the postwar period. This also was reflected in the assistance which the Soviet Union gave in the fifties and sixties to the people of Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, the GDR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in defense of their revolutionary achievements against external enemies and internal antisocialist forces.

The enemies of socialism attempt to pass off this activity by the Soviet Army as some kind of "expansion" and "export of the revolution." The Swiss political scientist Jacques Fremont presented just such a line in his speech at the 11th World Congress of the International Association of Political Sciences held in Moscow in August 1979. This line received a worthy rebuff on the part of Soviet scholars. Our assistance to brothers in class was given at the request of their governments and in the interests of defending the achievements of socialism, and consequently in the interests of social progress.

The assertions by bourgeois politicians and ideologists about an allegedly increasing "Soviet military threat" are absolutely absurd and slanderous. Yes, our country is forced to strengthen its Armed Forces in the face of military preparations being forced by imperialism, but this is being done for the sole purpose of making them a reliable guardian over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the bulwark of general peace, and thus to contribute to social progress.

Socialism and peace are deeply interconnected. Socialism needs peace, not war, to reveal all its advantages and set an example of social progress for nations. By acting as a mighty obstacle in the path of the aggressive aspirations of imperialism, the Soviet Armed Forces thus make a contribution to the progressive development of socialism and the overall progress of mankind.

Our Army performs this role in close unity with armies of other fraternal countries of socialism participating in the Warsaw Pact. By defending socialism and constraining the aggressive forces of international imperialism, armies of the fraternal countries exert a progressive influence on the course of world history and on the world revolutionary process.

The Soviet Armed Forces also play an important part within our country in the development of our society itself. This is reaffirmed very specifically in the CPSU Central Committee Decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work." This very important political document notes that service in the Soviet Army and Navy is a remarkable school of labor and military training, moral purity and courage, patriotism and comradeship.

The Soviet Armed Forces are a military organization of a new, higher socialist type. They are profoundly progressive in their nature, in their purpose and in their activities.

GENERAL GORCHAKOV'S ADVICE TO JUNIOR OFFICERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Col Gen P. Gorchakov, Hero of the Soviet Union: "Years as a Lieutenant: The Authority of the Political Officer"]

[Excerpts] Senior Politruk P. A. Gorchakov was appointed regimental commissar at age 24. He passed over the roads of war from Yel'ts to Prague. He took part in combat operations in the Bryansk, Central and 4th Ukrainian fronts. The political officer's organizational talent, courage and valor were recognized by many orders and medals. In 1943 Lt Col Gorchakov was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. He is a participant of the historic Victory Parade, in which he commanded a company of standardbearers of the composite regiment of the 4th Ukrainian Front. Col Gen Gorchakov now is Member of the Military Council and Chief of the Political Directorate of the Strategic Missile Forces.

Our political officers among the troops perform combat duty on an equal with the commanders. Their direct participation in the performance of important tasks and their personal example have an enormous indoctrinational significance. The fact is that this is very important if a political officer who has mastered the specialty to perfection and has a good knowledge of the specific nature of the missilemen's work calls for the need to be constantly on guard. One can be sure that his words will not go unnoticed.

It is true that the understanding of the personal example often is narrowed in the minds of some indoctrinators. There are among the political officers even those officers who always are ready to show how to perform an exercise with the submachinegun. And should the need arise, they will also run a crosscountry distance together with the soldiers. They can do a great deal, and they try, but the trouble is that some of them have slight influence in the collective. What is the problem?

And it is here that we probably come to the important element, to that which I would call a determining trait in the political officer's personality. Speak with people who have completed service in the Army: What did they value in political officers above all? Sincerity and moral purity. It is not by chance that sensitiveness, party principle and honesty displayed literally in everything are in first place. Sometimes unobtrusive and not immediately perceptible, they comprise the firmest foundation for the political officer's authority. We speak and write a great deal about this. It would seem that everything is clear. But how difficult the spiritual and moral development of the young officer sometimes is and how costly the mistakes and errors here.

Not even two years have passed since Sr Lt V. Sanovnichenko was assigned deputy commander for political affairs of a subunit. He now is a respected person in the collective, but there was an incident in his service which could have played an unseemly role in the further development of the political officer and party member.

This happened when Sanovnichenko was acting as the commander for the first time. A commission was working in the subunit at that time. During the check it was discovered that the team commanded by Officer P. Men'shov might not fulfill its pledges and reaffirm the title of outstanding. At least Sr Lt Sanovnichenko decided that such a danger existed, inasmuch as the specialists did not demonstrate those results which everyone expected of them in an integrated practice for the record. On the other hand, the team commanded by Sr Lt K. Abramov proved on top of the matter, as they say.

Sr Lt Sanovnichenko realized that the subunit could not be declared outstanding if Officer Men'shov's subordinates did not fulfill their pledges. And life forced the political officer to make a choice: Either everything would happen in just that way, and then the subunit commander would be annoyed and disappointed and would be dissatisfied with his deputy, or... And he made a decision. He summoned Men'shov and proposed: "Rewrite your collective pledges and exclude the point that the team must become outstanding. Sr Lt Abramov's team will make this pledge in place of yours and the subunit will lose nothing."

The step most damaging to the political officer's authority thus was taken: He prompted his comrade to scorn that for which he himself was obligated to fight. Party Member Men'shov firmly objected: "We will not reject our pledges. Our conscience does not permit it. And I make bold to assure you that, despite the first failure, the team still will prove it is worthy of the title of outstanding."

And that is what happened...

These were difficult days for the political officer. His egotism forced him to make excuses for some time yet: Allegedly he was attempting to make it better for the entire collective. He thus counted on support and sympathy.

But the imperceptible shadow of silent condemnation already hung over him. The young officer had to be given his due--he managed to cope with this moral ailment. His senior comrades helped him in this persistently and delicately. I am convinced that the lesson the senior lieutenant received will be a "notch" in his memory forever.

Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin said: "In order to genuinely educate, one not only must have a good knowledge of his job, but also have a pure soul. . . . For the educator influences the subjects not only by the fact that he gives them specific knowledge, but also by his behavior and way of life...

This is why I would like to say once more to my young colleagues and my comrades in work: There is nothing more important for the political officer than moral purity, high ideals and principle, close contact with people, and a sensitive attitude toward them. And the sooner the young political officer acquires these qualities, the more satisfaction service will bring to him and the more often the joy of success will come to him in his difficult and surprisingly excellent career.

6904

CSO: 1801

PUBLICATIONS: ERRORS IN AIR DEFENSE JOURNAL CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Arty A. Sherstyuk, professor: "A Reader's Remarks: Vexing Inaccuracies"]

[Text] The military journal VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY has won the recognition and respect of military readers for its meaningful articles and for posing problematical questions. It is the more vexing that recently the journal published a number of articles which not only have inaccuracies, but mistakes as well.

It is known, for example, that AAA of the Ground Forces during the Great Patriotic War destroyed over 21,000 enemy aircraft, and a large number of them with the fire of the Model 1939 37-mm automatic antiaircraft gun. But we learn with surprise from the article by Col V. Klevtsov entitled "Ground Forces Air Defense in the War Years" (Issue No 7 of the journal) that this gun was not used in the war, since it was only being tested in 1944-1945. The author further states that the 25-mm automatic antiaircraft gun also came into the inventory after the war. In reality, however, the Model 1939 37-mm automatic antiaircraft gun and the Model 1940 25-mm automatic antiaircraft gun were accepted in the inventory even before the war.

The article states that air defense personnel and weapons were not organizationally formed on the eve of the war. In reality, however, they were organizationally formed into AAA battalions, which were part of rifle divisions and corps and into AAA regiments, which were part of armies. The crux of the problem lay not in the organizational structure of the troop air defense system, but in the fact that the troops lacked AAA, especially of small caliber.

The author's statement that air defense personnel and weapons of the Ground Forces were part of the National Air Defense Forces also is erroneous. Ground air defense weapons assigned to screen the troops were fully independent of the ground air defense weapons which were screening the country's rear area installations, although they were associated by common control both in the district and at the Armed Forces level. Moreover, prior to

November 1941 the National Air Defense Forces did not exist as a branch of the Armed Forces.

And Col Klevtsov's statement that fighter aviation was part of the air forces of combined-arms armies on the eve of the war also is quite incorrect. The air forces, which were an independent branch of the Armed Forces, were not part of combined-arms armies either on the eve of or during the war. The combined-arms armies only were reinforced with aviation, including fighter aviation from the front air force.

There also are certain mistakes in the generally pithy article entitled "How Hitler's Plan for a Strategic Air War Against the USSR Failed," published in the sixth issue of the journal. Col D. Gorbatenko states that the radius of the fascist German Heinkel-177 aircraft allowed making attacks against rear area installations to the entire depth of our country's territory by landing on airfields of Northeast China, captured in those years by Japanese militarists. Even using the airfields situated on USSR territory occupied in 1941-1942, the Heinkel-177 bomber could not have made a "shuttle" operation for a distance of 5,500-6,000 km, since its range was considerably less. The presence of this mistake can be explained by an uncritical attitude toward publications which appeared in the West, the authors of which falsify the history of the past war and cite many far-fetched data.

It would appear that the editors of VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY would do everything necessary to ensure that such mistakes in the journal's pages do not confuse the readers.

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